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1Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Anyone can be angry-that is easy. But to be angry with the right person, 
to the right degree, at the right time, for the right purpose, and in the right way-
 this is not easy.
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics
Transference has existed as long as there have been men and women with
emotions. In ancient Greece, Aristotle was unknowingly the first to document the essence 
of transference- emotions and the ways in which we express them. Anger that is 
displaced onto the “wrong person,” sadness that is projected to the “wrong degree,” fear 
that stirs at the “wrong time” and for the “wrong purpose,” or love that is expressed in the 
“wrong way,” can all be examples of transference. The present study is a beginning 
attempt to understand the role that emotions play in the development and expression of 
client transference, a component of the therapeutic relationship (Gelso & Carter, 1985). It 
was hypothesized that transference is the manifestation of inappropriate emotional 
responses in relationships. In other words, clients transfer emotional responses that 
rightfully arose in early interpersonal relationships to relationships in which such 
responses are no longer appropriate. On the other hand, emotional intelligence is an 
individual difference variable that taps into one’s ability to construct and express 
appropriate emotions, given a particular context (Mayer & Salovey, 1995). 
In addition to constructing context-specific emotions, emotional intelligence has 
to do with the ability to “read” the unique message that each emotion carries (Mayer &
2Geher, 1996). It was hypothesized that emotional intelligence, or the ability to “read” the 
information and “see” the implications of emotions, would predict insight in 
psychotherapy. Insight has been shown to moderate the relationship between transference 
and outcome (Gelso, Kivlighan, Wine, Jones, & Friedman, 1997). Specifically, insight is 
thought to help clients work through or manage transference, as high insight and high 
transference have been shown to predict the most favorable outcome. When they fail to 
fit the context, emotions may give us misleading information that perpetuates 
maladaptive relationship patterns, or transferences. However, when explored in context, 
emotions can also reveal insights into the self and one’s agency in relationships. 
Emotions often arise in response to a person’s evolving relationships. Mayer, 
Caruso, and Salovey (2000) write that “when a person’s relationship to a memory, to his 
family, or to all of humanity changes, that person’s emotions will change as well” 
(p.267). When a person recalls a bitter memory with a lover or a friend, the whole word 
seems less inviting. Likewise, when we find ourselves in a situation with a significant 
other that somehow reminds us of a past relationship, feelings experienced at an earlier 
time and place often flood the present. In this sense, “emotions track relationships” 
(Mayer et al., 2000), and through doing so they convey meaning about them (Schwarz & 
Clore, 1983). When emotional reactions to a particular relationship are accurate or
appropriate, emotions can divulge a plethora of information about one’s environment. For 
example, when one person in a relationship behaves aggressively, the response of fear in 
the other person is a healthy motivator and signal. Emotions are internal responses to 
relationships; as such they are a source of information needed to understand the self and 
3the self in the context of others. As expanded below, individuals vary in their ability to 
construct and express emotions that fit a particular context, or interpersonal relationship.
Relationships are complex and multifaceted. Gelso and Carter (1985) propose that 
the therapeutic relationship is composed of the working alliance, real relationship, and 
transference. Gelso and Hayes (1998) define transference as, “ the client’s experience of 
the therapist that is shaped by the client’s own psychological structures and past and 
involves displacement, onto the therapist, of feelings, attitudes, and behaviors belonging 
rightfully in earlier significant relationships” (p.51). Grenyer and Luborsky (1996) write 
that transference extends beyond the therapeutic relationship, as clients come to therapy 
with maladaptive relationship themes that cause conflict in life. It was purposed that at 
the heart of transference is an emotional response that belongs rightfully in an earlier 
significant relationship(s). In other words, transference involves inappropriate affect, as it 
is not a direct response to a specific relationship but a generalized emotional response to 
all interpersonal relationships. 
To the degree that a client experiences and expresses transference, his or her 
ability to process relevant emotional information in response to unique relationships is 
thwarted. On the other hand, Mayer and Salovey (1995) propose that emotional 
intelligence involves adaptive emotional responses to the environment. They propose that 
individuals develop an ‘emotional model’ consisting of assumptions about emotions. 
These assumptions guide emotional construction and regulation. Furthermore, they argue 
that an emotionally intelligence model holds the assumption that emotions should fit the 
context. Accordingly, this paper argues that emotional intelligence is related to one’s 
ability to experience appropriate, context specific, emotional responses in relationships. 
4Thus, it was hypothesized that emotional intelligence is negatively related to 
transference.
One frequent goal of counseling is to help clients gain insight into the 
transference. Freud (1923) believed that transference acted as a “powerful ally” to 
treatment when “its presence can be detected each time and explained to the patient” 
(p.141). Freud argued that detecting and understanding, or analyzing, transference should 
result in the resolution of it. Similarly, Greenson (1967) observed that client insight tends 
to have a mitigating affect on psychological symptoms. Graff and Luborsky (1977) found 
that in long-term psychoanalysis, transference and insight increases linearly in successful 
cases of treatment. They explained these results by reasoning that while transference is 
encouraged in treatment, it is increasingly controlled by insight outside of the therapeutic 
relationship. Insight can help people create new ways of thinking and feeling, providing 
people with new modes of behavior. The most promising research on insight and 
transference reveals an interaction effect of transference and insight on outcome. Gelso, 
Hill, and Kivlighan (1991) found a significant interaction between insight and 
transference on session outcome. Similarly, Gelso et al. (1997) found an interaction effect 
of transference and insight on short-term counseling outcome. 
Transference alone does not appear to predict the success or failure of counseling. 
However, when combined with the presence of insight, transference predicts outcome, as 
self-awareness enables the client to act on alternative thoughts and feelings. The present 
experiment extended the research on the interaction effect of transference and insight on 
session outcome. Specifically, it was predicted that high insight and high transference 
5would have a positive effect on session outcome when emotional intelligence is relatively 
high and to a lesser degree when emotional intelligence is low. 
According to the growing body of literature, insight is an important variable in the 
context of the counseling relationship and outcome. Thus, identifying individual 
difference variables that may predict client insight is a crucial yet largely missing area of 
research exploration. This paper explored whether client emotional intelligence predicts 
insight in counseling. Emotions provide information about emotions themselves, the 
other, the environment, and the self (Greenberg, 2002). The theory of emotional 
intelligence proposes that people vary in their ability to understand emotional 
information, or “hear” the implications of emotions (Mayer & Geher, 1996). Emotional 
intelligence is involved with the input and process phases of emotion-relevant 
information (Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2003). As with other forms of 
intelligence, the ways in which an individual inputs and processes knowledge influences 
the way he or she sees the world and maneuvers through it. To the degree that one can 
input emotional knowledge and process it accurately, so that it is an accurate reflection of 
one’s psychic world and/or external environment, one can use emotional knowledge to 
gain awareness or insight into oneself and one’s environment. In particular, since 
emotions often arise in response to relationships, if decoded carefully, they will provide 
insight into the components of interpersonal relationships, such as transference. In 
therapy, insight may come from external sources such as the therapist’s feedback or 
interpretations, or it may arise from internal sources of information such as thoughts and 
feelings. The present paper explored clients’ ability to process and utilize emotional 
information in the construction of insight. 
6                 Counseling is an emotionally charged environment where emotional 
intelligence may prove to be particularly salient and crucial to understanding the 
therapeutic relationship and obtaining a successful outcome. Among clients, there exists 
some variation in the ability to process and utilize emotional information to problem 
solve. To varying degrees, we attend to, understand, and regulate our emotions and those 
of others. Emotional intelligence involves the ability to construct emotion that fits a 
particular context and the ability to manage emotional responses. Thus, it was 
hypothesized that emotional intelligence would be inversely related to transference, the 
expression of a certain type of inappropriate emotional response. In addition, it was 
predicted that emotional intelligence would predict client insight in counseling, as it deals 
with the ability to understand emotions and process emotional information. Lastly, this 
paper built on past research that suggests an interaction effect of insight and transference 
on outcome by hypothesizing 2-two way interaction effects involving emotional 
intelligence, insight, and transference on session outcome. While theoretically and 
empirically speaking (see Gelso et al., 1997), insight is an important variable to the 
therapeutic process and outcome, we know very little about the precursors of it. 
Similarly, while we are beginning to empirically examine the content of transference (see 
Grenyer & Luborsky, 1996), we know relatively little about how the level of transference 
influences therapy. This experiment proposed that emotional intelligence explains an 
important component of both transference and insight.
7Chapter 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Why do people have emotions, and what should they do with them. They have them 
because emotions are crucial to survival, communication, and problem solving.
Emotions are signals, ones worth listening to.
- Greenberg, Emotion Focused Therapy(p.11)
Emotions are like messengers who deliver vital information about the self and the 
world to those who are willing to listen. In 1872, Darwin noticed the universality of 
emotional expressions and the necessity for emotions if a species is to survive and thrive, 
in The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals. One hundred and eighteen years 
later, John Mayer and colleagues have begun to research how the organism processes and 
utilizes emotional information. From Freud to Rogers, the therapeutic process has 
focused on experiencing emotions and then using them to understand and manage our 
maladaptive behaviors. Emotions provide information about emotions themselves, the 
other, the environment, and the self (Greenberg, 2002). Each emotion carries its own 
unique message and piece of knowledge that can help people understand the world 
around them. Decoding emotional information can lead to insight, or an understanding of 
the underlying dynamics of behaviors, thoughts, and attitudes. 
Emotions arise in response to relationships. For example, a person who is viewed 
as threatening is feared (Mayer & Salovey, 1995). The ability to accurately receive the 
messages that our emotions deliver, regarding relationships, helps us to maneuver 
through our interpersonal world. For example, experiencing guilt may direct our attention 
8to conflict in a relationship, motivating us to work toward a resolution. When our 
emotions are a direct response to another individual, we gain access to information about 
the other, the self, and the relationship. Oftentimes, emotions may feel as if they are 
directly responding to another individual. Yet, in actuality, they are responding to 
relationships in an earlier place and time. When ‘emotional messages’ get “crossed”, we 
struggle to maintain healthy and soothing relationships. For example, if one feels 
undervalued in all relationships, one will miss the interpersonal signs that convey 
empathy and acceptance. When our emotions inappropriately respond to others in a way 
that they once responded to earlier significant relationships, we perpetuate maladaptive 
relationship themes, or transferences. 
Transference, first described by Freud (1912/1959), characterizes one’s 
maladaptive relationship patterns that originate in childhood. Transference acts as 
blinders that block from sight accurate emotional signals and information regarding 
relationships. Thus, it is exceedingly difficult to construct appropriate emotional 
responses in relationships. It is theorized that emotional intelligence is the ability to 
perceive unique interpersonal cues and to use these cues to guide one’s emotional 
responses in relationships. Recognizing and understanding the emotions that belie 
transference, i.e., achieving insight, leads to a more successful session and treatment 
outcome in therapies of various theoretical orientations (e.g., Gelso, Hill, & Kivlighan, 
1991; Gelso, Kivlighan, Wine, Jones, & Friedman, 1997). This study was the first to 
explore how emotional intelligence effects counseling process variables, such as 
transference and insight, and session outcome. 
9Emotional Intelligence
A Model of Emotional Intelligence (EI): Ability vs. Mixed
Emotional intelligence involves the capacity to perceive emotions, assimilate 
emotion-related thoughts, understand the information that emotions can provide the self, 
and effectively manage emotions (Mayer & Salovey, 1997; Salovey & Mayer, 1990). EI 
can be assessed most directly by asking a person to solve emotional problems, for 
example, one type of emotional problem may involve identifying the emotion in a human 
face, abstract design, or color swatch (Mayer, Dipaolo, & Salovey, 1990). Mayer and 
Salovey have led the construction of an ability model of EI in which test takers are asked 
to solve emotional problems. From this perspective, EI can be operationalized as a set of 
mental abilities that enhance the processing of emotional and cognitive information and 
thus help the individual to problem solve and make more adaptive decisions (Mayer & 
Salovey, 1993). To date, Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, and Sitarenios (2003) have developed 
the only ability measure of EI. 
              Other approaches to defining and measuring EI ask test takers their self-reported 
beliefs about their emotional intelligence. A self-report measure of EI may include items 
such as, “I’m in touch with my emotions,” or “I am a sensitive person” (e.g., Mayer & 
Stevens, 1994; Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai, 1995). However, self-reports 
of ability and actual ability are only minimally correlated in the realm of intelligence 
research (e.g., r=. 20 or 4 %; Paulhus, Lysy, & Yik, 1998), including EI (Davies, 
Stankov, & Roberts, 1998). Self-report measures of intelligence are important because 
people often act on their beliefs about their abilities as opposed to their actual abilities 
(Bandura, 1977). Yet, in the realm of intelligence, self-report measures that are easily 
10
faked and influenced by self-concept, fail to measure one’s natural ability to perform a 
given task, whether that task involves verbal, spatial, or emotional knowledge. 
                 Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, and Palfai (1995) developed a self-report 
measure of emotional intelligence that is designed to tap into one’s perception of one’s 
emotional abilities. Specifically, the Trait-Meta Mood Scale (TMMS; Salovey et al., 
1995) indexes the degree of attention that individuals devote to their feelings, the clarity 
of their experience of these feelings, and their ability to regulate their feelings. The three 
subscales of the TMMS (attention, clarity, and regulation) are similar constructs to the 
four subscales of the MSCEIT (perceive emotions, facilitate thought from emotions, 
understand emotions, and manage emotions); the ability based measure developed by 
Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso (2003). Salovey et al. (1995) do not claim that the TMMS is 
an index of an emotional IQ as measured by the MSCEIT, or a measure of one’s actual 
emotional abilities or competencies. On the other hand, they purpose that it measures 
perceived emotional intelligence, which is a useful construct in identifying core 
individual differences that may characterize emotionally intelligent individuals (Salovey 
et al., 1995). 
The perception of one’s emotional intelligence is an interesting individual 
difference variable. For example, it may take into account one’s motivation to achieve 
emotional competencies and one’s preference to act on these competencies. Also, 
individuals may be more likely to modify their behaviors based on their beliefs about 
their abilities rather than their actual abilities (Bandura, 1977). Lastly, psychotherapy 
values a client’s willingness to disclose and understand feelings. These values start with 
an individual's willingness to attend to feelings and to experience these feelings clearly 
11
(Salovey et al., 1995). Perceived emotional intelligence, as measured by the TMMS, 
cannot produce an actual emotional IQ. However, it can provide important insights into 
the ways in which one’s beliefs about his or her emotional intelligence affects emotional 
processing, regulation, and adaptive decision making. The TMMS is a unique self-report 
measure of emotional intelligence in that it closely mirrors the ability framework of 
emotional intelligence (Mayer & Salovey, 1993) rather than combining numerous 
personality traits and preferences. 
             Emotional intelligence has often been conceptualized (particularly in the popular 
literature) as more then the ability to perceive, assimilate, understand, and manage 
emotions (Mayer et al., 2003). These alternative approaches define EI as more than an 
ability, or skill, but also as motivation, non-ability dispositions and traits, and global 
personal and social functioning (e.g., Bar-On, 1997; Goleman, 1995). Mayer, Caruso, and 
Salovey (2000) call such models mixed models because of all the concepts they combine. 
These self-report measures are used to assess mixed models. For example, the Bar-On 
Emotional Quotient Inventory includes 15 self-report scales that measure a person’s self-
regard, independence, problem solving, reality-testing and other attributes (Bar-On, 
1997). Such dimensions as problem solving and reality testing seem more closely related 
to ego strength or social competence than to EI (Mayer et al., 2000). Perhaps future 
research will reveal that some of these non-cognitive attributes, often incorporated in 
mixed models of EI, are possible products or overt expressions of EI. However, in order 
for EI to be accepted as a type of intelligence, we must first tease out concepts that are 
“mixed in.” 
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Emotions and Cognitions: Who Would Have Thought?
While EI has received much praise from the lay public and professionals alike, it 
has also been subject to harsh criticism. One potential reason behind the critique’s zeal 
(see Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2002) has to do with the attention that mixed models 
have received from the media, overshadowing Mayer and Salovey’s ability model. The 
media has made exaggerated and unscientific claims concerning what EI actually is and 
what benefits it will yield for an individual. For example, Goleman (1995, 1996), a chief 
proponent of the mixed model conception of EI, reasons that if IQ tests are known to 
predict 20 % of the variance in performance, then EI must account for 80 % of the 
variance in performance. Although Goleman’s conception of EI includes an extensive list 
of personality traits, such as “getting along with others, self-motivation, persistence, 
controlling impulses, empathizing, and regulating one’s mood”(1995, p.49), it is unlikely 
that individual differences alone account for 100 % of a person’s behavior. The 
exaggerated claims and confounding definitions of EI made by proponents of the mixed 
model and the media invite criticism from the scientific community. However, another 
possible reason standing in the way of EI’s acceptance involves the historic separation 
between emotion and cognition.
Traditionally, emotions cloud judgement; they do not enhance it. Plato (427-347 
B. C.) believed that emotions were a source of embarrassment (cited in De Sousa, 1987) 
that prevent men from seeing things clearly. In the 1700’s, psychological processes were 
divided into those of cognition, emotion, and conation (Candland, 1977). Recall that 
many beliefs in the 18th century were infused with rationalistic values, based on the belief 
that “ only in the rational or intellectual functions did mankind reach its proper stature” 
13
(Leeper, 1948, p.8.). During the 30’s and 40’s, renowned psychologists such as P.Y. 
Young, N.L. Mann, and R.S. Woodworth described emotions as “disruptive” and 
“disorganizing" responses that are the antithesis to thinking. Rationalistic values linger in 
today’s cultural beliefs and values, influencing social norms and the way in which we 
communicate and understand emotions (Goleman, 1995). 
One of the first voices to challenge the traditional zeitgeist of emotions was 
Robert Leeper. Leeper (1984) argued that (a) emotions and cognitions interact in 
meaningful ways, (b) emotions are organized responses, and (c) emotions constitute an 
essential part of people’s lives. Leeper paved the way for psychologists to examine the 
interaction between emotions and cognitions, specifically how emotions underlie and 
guide thought. For example, Isen (1984) wrote that emotions do not interrupt thought; 
they redirect ongoing thoughts and actions. Izard (1993) noted that there is increasingly 
wide acceptance for the notion that “emotions are motivational processes that influence 
cognition and action” (p.68). 
More recently, Mayer and Salovey (1990) proposed that emotions are adaptive to 
the organism, as they are organized responses to internal and external events that have 
positive or negative valences for the individual. For example, emotions such as fear or 
anxiety redirect our attention to threatening and potentially dangerous stimuli. 
Accordingly, every emotion serves a unique purpose and function, “Each emotion moves 
according to it’s own characteristic rules, like the different pieces on a chessboard. 
Emotional Intelligence involves the ability to see the pieces, know how they move, and 
reason about emotions accordingly” (Mayer et al., 1998, p.3). Views toward emotions 
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and cognitions have begun to shift from seeing the two as disparate entities to mutually 
interacting processes capable of enhancing human functioning.
Emotional Intelligence and Traditional Standards of Intelligence
Conceptions of intelligence. Since the early 1900’s, when Alfred Binet developed 
an intelligence test that could identify learning impaired children, many psychologists 
have proceeded to formulate their own conceptions of intelligence. Some researchers 
have used narrowly defined prototypes to describe intelligence. For example, Salovey 
and Mayer (1990) point out that Terman defined intelligence solely as the ability to think 
abstractly. Other researchers have expanded the concept of intelligence to include a broad 
range of abilities. Humphrey (1979) defined intelligence as “the entire repertoire of 
acquired skills, knowledge, learning, and generalization tendencies considered 
intellectual in nature that are available at any one period of time” (p.106).  Across the 
spectrum, from narrow to broad definitions of intelligence, the term “ability” is found in 
every definition of intelligence. Carroll (1993) defines an ability as “ a latent trait or 
characteristic of individuals that expresses itself in differential performances on a class of 
tasks that vary in their demands (generally, their difficulty or their timed nature) as a 
function of defined task attributes” (p.267). For example, the concept of verbal 
intelligence could be demonstrated by measuring a person’s ability to understand words. 
The ability model of EI defines a new area of intelligence because it includes new types 
of abilities not previously considered in the conception of intelligence (Mayer, Caruso, & 
Salovey, 2000).
Traditional View of Intelligence. Some researchers advocate a narrow conception 
of intelligence that is limited to a few specific abilities, or what is commonly referred to 
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as the general g factor. This perspective originated in the beginning of the 20th century 
with the advent of a statistical procedure called factor analysis (Spearman, 1904). This 
perspective became known as the psychometric approach, which generates a measure of 
general intelligence, g, from the common variance underlying tests of carefully defined 
psychometric properties (Spearman, 1927). Advocates of the psychometric approach 
(e.g., Burt, 1949; Guilford, 1967; Weschler, 1958) agree that intelligence can be derived 
using factor analysis. However, they often debate over which model of intelligence best 
represents the data. They tend to either support g (e.g., Jensen, 1994) or a particular 
number of lower level or group factors (e.g., Guilford, 1967). For example, Guilford 
(1967) proposed that intelligence consists of 12 factors. Traditionally, the g factor is 
thought to capture intelligence, rather than looking at intelligence as multi-dimensional.  
Theories of Multiple Intelligences. Mayer and Salovey are not the first 
psychologists to push the envelope on traditional intelligence tests, arguing that the 
general g factor is composed of more then traditional academic intelligence (APA 
Monitor, 2003). The idea that people possess different types of intelligence can be traced 
back to Thorndike’s (1920) Tripartite Theory of Intelligence. He suggested that there are 
three types of intelligence: abstract, mechanical, and social. Thorndike defined social 
intelligence as the “ability to understand and mange men and women, boys and girls” 
(1920, p.228). Social intelligence has received the least empirical attention out of the 
tripartite because it is the hardest to distinguish from other forms of intelligence, both 
theoretically (e.g., Mayer & Salovey, 1993) and empirically (Cronbach, 1960). Interest in 
social intelligence, however, has recently been revived (see Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987; 
Sternberg & Smith, 1985). Initial attempts to empirically distinguish social intelligence 
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from abstract intelligence yielded unsuccessful results (e.g., Keating, 1978; Thorndike & 
Stein, 1937). However, with the advent of measures of social intelligence that include 
cognitive and behavioral dimensions, researchers have been able to provide evidence for 
social intelligence as an independent construct (e.g., Wrong, Day, Maxwell, & Meara, 
1995).
The empirical reviews of social intelligence as an independent, yet related, 
intelligence has been mixed. However, Mayer and Geher (1996) theorize that rather then 
dropping the idea of social intelligence, it makes sense to more plainly distinguish it from 
other types of intelligence, by subdividing it into emotional and motivational intelligence. 
According to their theory, motivational intelligence involves understanding motivations 
such as the need for achievement, affiliation, or power, as well as understanding tacit 
knowledge related to those motivations (e.g., Wagner & Sternberg, 1985) and the goal 
setting related to them (Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987). In contrast, emotional intelligence 
involves recognizing emotions, reasoning with emotions and emotion-related 
information, and processing emotional information as a part of one’s general problem-
solving ability (Salovey & Mayer, 1990). Emotional and social intelligence are both 
considered to be hot intelligences, meaning that they involve the ego or the self, as 
compared to cold intelligences, such as verbal or spatial intelligence, that minimally 
involve the ego or self (Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 2000). Mayer and Geher (1996) point 
out that emotional and social intelligence both involve accurately recognizing the 
emotional state of another. However, this emotional information may be processed 
differently for social and emotional intelligence because the ultimate goal, or problem in 
17
need of a solution, differs. However, more research is needed to compare and contrast 
social and emotional intelligence.
In addition to proponents of social intelligence, certain psychologists have 
challenged intelligence testing that solely focuses on cognitive or abstract intelligence, by 
theorizing multi-dimensional models of intelligence. In the early 1980’s, Gardner 
emerged as a chief proponent of multiple intelligence theory. He attacked the idea that 
there was a single, immutable intelligence. Instead, he suggested that there were seven 
distinct intelligences: linguistic, logical-mathematical, musical, bodily kinesthetic, 
spatial, interpersonal, and intrapersonal (APA Monitor, 2003). Gardner’s formulation has 
had little impact on testing, in part because the kinds of factor-analytic studies that might 
validate the theory in the eyes of the testing community have never been conducted (APA 
Monitor, 2003). 
In contrast, Sternberg has taken a more direct approach to changing the practice of 
testing. In his book, Beyond IQ: A Triarchic Theory of Human Intelligence (1985), he 
argued that “intelligence is not a single thing . . . it comprises a wide array of cognitive 
and other skills” (p.327). The Sternberg Triarchic Abilities Test (STAT) is a battery of 
multiple-choice questions that tap into three independent aspects of intelligence: analytic, 
practical, and creative. Recently, Sternberg and collaborators completed the first phase of 
the Rainbow Project that put the triarchic theory to the test. The goal of the project was to 
enhance the prediction of college success and decrease test differences for ethnic 
minorities. About 800 college students took the STAT along with performance-based 
measures of creativity and practical intelligence.  Sternberg and his collaborators found 
that the triarchic measures predicted a significant portion of variance on college grade 
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point average, even after SAT scores and high school GPA had been accounted for. The 
test also produced smaller differences between ethnic groups than the SAT (APA 
Monitor, 2003). Similar to the Triarchic Theory of Intelligence, in order for EI to be 
accepted as a type of multiple intelligence, a reliable and valid measure must be 
constructed that shows real world significance. 
EI Meets Traditional Standards of Intelligence. An intelligence must meet certain 
criteria before it can be considered scientifically legitimate. First, it should be capable of 
being operationalized as a set of mental abilities. Second, it should meet certain 
correlational criteria. Specifically, the abilities defined by the intelligence should form a 
related set, i.e., be intercorrelated, and be related to pre-existing intelligence’s, while also 
showing some unique variance. Third, the intelligence should develop over time with age 
and experience (Mayer et al., 2000). The following section examined whether the Mayer 
and Salovey measure of EI meets the traditional criteria of intelligence according to 
available research.
Conceptual Criteria. The first criteria is a conceptual one, as it holds that 
emotional intelligence must be described in terms of actual abilities rather then preferred 
courses of behavior. Most recently, Mayer et al., (2003) have operationalized EI along 
four branches or abilities: perceiving emotions, facilitating thought from emotions, 
understanding emotions, and managing emotions of self and other. These four broad 
classes of abilities can be arranged from lower, more molecular skills, to higher, more 
molar skills (Mayer et al., 2000). Mayer and colleagues have applied their definition of 
EI to the creation of an ability measure called the Mayer- Salovey- Caruso- Emotional 
Intelligence Test (MSCEIT; Mayer et al., 2003). According to the theory, perceiving 
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emotions is the ability on which all other emotional abilities rest, with managing 
emotions of self and other at the top of the hierarchy.
Factor analysis of the MSCEIT supports the way in which Mayer and Salovey 
operationalize EI (Mayer et al., 2003). A factor structure indicates how many entities a 
test can plausibly measure. In the case of the MSCEIT, the factor analysis indicates how 
many dimensions of EI the test “picks up.” Using a standardized sample (n=2,112), 
Mayer et al. (2003) performed a confirmatory factor analysis of the full scale MSCEIT 
V2.0, testing one-, two- , and four-factor models to examine the range of permissible 
factor structures for representing the EI domain. The g model, or one-factor model of EI, 
should load all eight MSCEIT tasks (2 per branch). The two-factor model divides the 
scale into Experiential (perceiving and facilitating) and Strategic (understanding and 
managing) branches. Lastly, the four-factor model loads the two designated tasks on each 
of the four branches. The factor analysis revealed a progressively better fit from the one 
to the four factor model, however, all fit fairly well (4 vs. 2 factors, X2 (4)= 253, p< .001; 
2 vs. 1 factors, X2  (1)= 279, p< .001) (Mayer et al., 2003). 
Though the factor analysis is promising, chi-square values are a function of 
sample size, and thus they may reflect the 2000 individuals involved in the study instead 
of an absolute quality of fit (Mayer et al., 2003). To compensate, fit indices independent 
of sample size were computed. For example, the normed fit index (NFI) ranged from .99 
to .98 across models, which is excellent (Bentler & Bonnett, 1980). Steiger’s (1990) root-
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), ranged from .12 for the one factor 
solution which is a bit high, to an adequate .05 for the four factor solution. However, 
MacCallum and Austin (2000) have noted that alternative models to those tested often fit 
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well with the data as well. This was the case with the three-factor model tested on this 
data. However, Mayer et al. (2003) intentionally violated the four-factor model by 
shifting the second task on each branch to the next branch up. In this case, the chi-square 
rises from 94 to 495 and the fit indices become unacceptable (e.g., TLI drops from .96 to 
.78). To summarize, the factor analysis suggests that one-, two- , and four-factor models 
provide viable representations of the EI domain, as assessed by the MSCEIT. Thus, it 
appears that Mayer et al., (2003) successfully operationalized EI as four distinct yet 
related abilities that comprise one general factor. 
Correlational Criteria. EI should define a set of abilities that are moderately 
intercorrelatd with one another, and are related to other pre-existing intelligences, while 
also showing some unique variance (see Carroll, 1993). Mayer, Caruso, and Salovey 
(2000) found that EI, as measured by the MEIS (an earlier version of the MSCEIT), 
correlates with verbal intelligence (which served as a proxy for general intelligence) at a 
low to moderate level, r= .36, p<. 01, effect size= 12.96, as replicated in Mayer and 
Geher (1996). These results suggest that EI does meet the correlation criteria in that it 
moderately correlates with general intelligence (via verbal intelligence). However, the 
results provide only the roughest idea of the relationship between EI and other 
intelligences (Mayer et al., 2000). For example, traditional academic intelligence can be 
divided into crystallized and fluid intelligence, or verbal and performance intelligence 
(e.g., Carroll, 1993). Future research must continue to explore the relationship between 
EI and preexisting forms of intelligence.
In addition, the four branches of EI (see Mayer et al., 2003), should moderately 
intercorrelate with one another. Research suggests that the tasks on the MSCEIT 
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interrelate using both general and consensus scoring. The intercorrelations between the 
tasks range from r(1995-2111) = .17 to .59, ps < .01, effect size= 2.9- 34.8, but with 
many correlations in the mid thirties. Nonetheless, the correlations are acceptable and 
meet the traditional standards for intelligence (Mayer et al., 2003).
Developmental Criterion. The third criterion of a traditional intelligence is that 
intellectual capacities grow with age and experience from childhood to early adulthood 
(Brown, 1997; Fancher, 1985). Mayer et al. (2000) conducted a study to test whether EI 
meets this final criterion of intelligence. They administered several portions (seven tasks) 
of the MEIS to an adolescent sample (ages 12-16). The performance of the adolescents 
was then compared to the performance of an adult subsample of a previous study. The 
authors hypothesized that the adult sample would significantly outperform the 
adolescents on the scale. The investigators conducted a two (Age-Group) by seven (Task) 
ANOVA, where the seven tasks were within-subject variables. As the hypothesis 
predicted, scores were higher for adults than for adolescents according to consensus 
agreement (Grand Mean = 0.38 vs. 0.36; F (1, 713) = 23.8, p < .001), and expert 
agreement (Grand Mean = 0.66 vs. 0.64; F (1,709)= 22.3, p < .0001).
Though the Mayer et al. (2000) study was a first and promising attempt to 
establish EI as a construct that develops with age and experience, there were many 
methodological flaws. First, the significant differences found may have been due to 
cohort effects since a group of adolescents were compared to a separate group of adults. 
In addition, since this was not a longitudinal study we have no way of knowing whether 
the adults’ EI scores improved over time, or conversely if they remained high yet stable 
over time. Also, to obtain a consensus score, the researchers started with one adult 
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sample and divided it into two groups: one group served as a comparison group against 
the adolescents and the other group served as the consensus scoring group. Since the 
consensus group was pulled from the same sample as the comparison group there may be 
a bias toward the adults. Lastly, because of time considerations only a subset of tasks was 
administered to participants. Thus, the authors could not compare adolescents’ and 
adults’ general EI scores. It is left to future research to reveal how EI interacts with age 
and experience.
Reflecting upon the emotional intelligence literature in general, certain limitations 
seem to be prevalent. First, various studies have employed different versions of the 
ability based measure (MSCEIT; Mayer et al., 2003), as researchers have continued to 
develop and refine it’s psychometric properties. Second, the validity of the ability based 
measure of EI is questionable since it has been sparsely utilized in practical settings in 
which one may assess it’s relationship to theoretically related variables. Third, more 
research needs to be carried out in order to reveal the best scoring criterion. Lastly, 
throughout the literature, when EI is compared to other theoretically related variables, 
such as defensiveness (Mayer & Geher, 1996), low effect sizes are obtained. In this case, 
low effect sizes may be the result of self-report or inappropriate measures. 
Meta-Mood Experience
Mayer, Salovey, and colleagues have developed two frameworks of emotion 
intelligence that are related in construct yet differ in the method of measurement 
developed to assess them. Both of these frameworks measure one’s perception and 
expression of emotion, or attention to feelings, as well as one’s clarity or understanding 
of emotional states, and one’s regulation or management of feelings. However, one 
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framework utilizes an ability -based measure with items that have wrong and right 
answers that cannot be faked by the test-taker (see Salovey & Mayer, 1990). This 
measure of emotional intelligence resembles traditional intelligence tests. On the other 
hand, the other framework of emotional intelligence developed by Salovey and Mayer 
(see Mayer & Gaschke, 1988) assesses one’s emotional competencies with a self-report 
measure that indexes one’s experience of his or her ability to attend to, clearly 
understand, and regulate emotional information. This framework of perceived emotional 
intelligence grew out of Mayer and Salovey’s earlier work on the reflective processes that 
accompany most mood states.  
Mayer et al. (1988) demonstrated that there is an ongoing process associated with
moods whereby individuals continually reflect upon their feelings, monitoring, 
evaluating, and regulating them. They termed this process the meta-mood experience and 
developed the Meta Mood Experience Scale that measures an individual’s thoughts about 
an ongoing mood state. Because this measure emphasizes moment to moment changes in 
reflections about ongoing moods, it is now called the State Meta- Mood Scale (SMMS). 
The factors of the SMMS include beliefs about controllability of mood, clarity, 
acceptability, typicality, and changeability of mood.  
Although the meta-mood experience commonly occurs, the content or process of 
the experience differs between individuals, as cognitive processes are often learned and 
influenced by personality (Mayer et al., 1988). Individuals high on self-awareness and 
emotionality may have highly developed meta-mood experiences. In contrast, individuals 
who defend against feelings may undervalue and pay little attention to their mood states. 
Individuals clearly differ on the value they place on the meta-mood experience (Mayer et 
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al., 1988). Some cognitive values or beliefs about the meta-mood experience that 
individuals may hold, include: I feel ashamed of negative emotions, I can experience my 
bad mood and survive, my feelings help me think clearly, and I don’t care about my 
feelings. Thus, although Mayer et al. (1988) found similar phases of the meta-mood 
experience across individuals, how people use and think about these stages and the mood 
experience, as a whole, depends on one’s personality and perhaps one’s ability.
Mayer and Stevens (1994) correlated meta-mood experience factors with 
personality scales under the assumption that personality predicts an individual’s 
experiential style of the meta-mood experience. They theorized that reflection on ongoing 
emotional experiences would affect a person’s self-perception and thus his or her reports 
of the meta-experience. At the same time, they hypothesized that personality factors 
influence how one evaluates and attempts to regulate emotional experience. First, Mayer 
et al. (1994) used a multi-domain approach to factor analysis, which permits higher 
numbers of extracted dimensions while maintaining theoretical clarity, to divide the 
meta-experience into separate Evaluative and Regulatory domains, factor analyzing 
within each domain separately. Factor analysis of the Meta-Experience of Mood Scale 
revealed four Evaluation of mood and three Regulation of mood scales. Their coefficient 
alpha reliabilities were very good (r (762)= .75-. 87), and their low intercorrelations 
indicated that the subscales were independent of one another. 
In a separate study, Mayer and Stevens (1994) correlated the Evaluative 
dimensions of the meta-mood experience with criterion scales, such as those measuring 
self-consciousness and empathy, which rely on reference to one’s own feelings. 
Regulatory dimensions of the meta-experience were correlated with criterion scales 
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measuring causal attributes and coping mechanisms, which assess one’s perception of 
being able to act effectively upon one’s mood. Results suggest that two Evaluative scales, 
clarity and acceptance, correlate with Alexithymia subscales, measuring the ability to 
identify present emotional experience (r (221) =. 50; .30, respectively), and to describe 
those emotional experiences (r (221) = .32, .23). Both clarity and acceptance of mood 
were also moderately associated with fewer Borderline characteristics and negatively 
with wishful thinking and self-blame. 
As for the Regulatory scales, repair and dampening can be compared and 
contrasted to one another. Although the dimensions are uncorrelated with each other, 
both scales correlate in opposite directions with a variety of criteria. For example, on the 
Folkman and Lazarus (1985) coping measures, repair typically correlated in the direction 
of positive thinking; dampening with negative thinking. Although repairers tended to 
think positively, they also reported more Borderline symptoms, empathetic distress, and a 
poorer ability to identify emotion than non-repairers. 
Mayer et al. (1994) Evaluative scales of clarity, acceptance, influence, and 
typicality are similar to the four evaluative scales in Mayer et al. (1988; out of 
control/clarity/acceptance/typicality). The three regulatory scales of repair, maintenance, 
and dampening are theoretically and empirically more comprehensive and sensible than 
earlier versions of the meta-mood experience scale which contained one dimension of 
mood regulation called change.
 Although the development, process, and regulation of mood occurs on 
subconscious and conscious levels of awareness, Mayer et al. (1988) and Mayer et al. 
(1994) developed a measure of conscious mood evaluation and regulation. We 
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continually evaluate our conscious moods as adaptive or maladaptive, pleasant or 
unpleasant. The degree to which an individual can accurately monitor and adaptively 
regulate feelings to maneuver through his or her environment is an important individual 
difference variable. Mayer et al. (1994) developed a meta-mood experience scale that 
measures the experiential state of mood rather than the trait. The state-experience of 
mood as measured by the SMMS, would eventually evolve into the Trait- Meta Mood 
experience scale that measures one’s perceived ability or trait experience in monitoring, 
understanding, and regulating the meta-mood experience. 
Mayer et al. (1994) hypothesized that the degree to which people can monitor and 
evaluate their moods, as well as the balance an individual strikes between evaluating and 
regulating feelings, influences personality style and emotional intelligence. For example, 
certain individuals are always in control, and in particular, they exercise considerable 
control over their moods. They may vacillate between dampening positive moods and 
regulating negative ones. Other individuals may be too influenced by their moods and 
ruminate over them, allowing feelings to flood thinking rather than assist it. Finally, 
contemporary literature (e.g., Salovey et al., 1990) describes individuals who are 
particularly adept at understanding and dealing with their feelings. These emotionally 
open or emotionally intelligent people strike an appropriate balance between attending to, 
understanding, and regulating emotions. In particular, the degree to which people 
experience clarity of mood independent of the valence of the mood may predict a healthy 
personality style. For example, individuals experiencing clarity of mood report 
themselves to be autonomous, with good ego boundaries and good psychological health 
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(Mayer et al., 1994). Further research will hopefully reveal a clearer picture of how one’s 
meta-mood experience (state or trait) influences personality and behavior. 
Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, and Palfai (1995) developed the Trait- Meta 
Mood Scale (TMMS) to measure an ongoing process in which individuals continually 
reflect upon psychological states to monitor, discriminate, and regulate their emotions.  
The TMMS grew from research on the transitory or state measure of the meta-mood 
experience (see Mayer et al., 1988). The TMMS includes three components: attending to 
feelings, clarifying feelings, and repairing feelings. These three subscales operationalize a 
theoretically meaningful information-processing model in which inputs (attention to 
emotions) lead to mental processes (clarity of emotions) that subsequently produces 
outputs (repair of emotions) (Ghorbani, Bing, Watson, Davison, & Mack, 2002). Salovey 
et al. (1990) introduced the information-processing model of emotional intelligence in 
which people vary in their ability to detect, understand, and use emotional information to 
problem solve. An information-processing framework of emotional intelligence is more 
consistent with traditional views of intelligence than the mixed models of emotional 
intelligence described earlier. 
Similar to other measures of emotional intelligence, most of the research on the 
TMMS deals with measurement development. However, some studies exist that look at 
the relationship between perceived emotional intelligence (PEI), as measured by the 
TMMS, health, and interpersonal relationships. Salovey, Stroud, Woolery, and Epel 
(2002) examined the relationship between PEI and measures of psychological and 
physical functioning. Greater attention to mood was associated with greater empathy (r
(104)=. 44, ps<. 001), and perceptions of ability to distinguish among mood and skill at 
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mood repair were associated with lower levels of symptom reporting, social anxiety, and 
depression. Furthermore, the clarity and repair subscales of the TMMS were associated 
with greater levels of satisfaction with interpersonal relationships (r (93)=. 39 for clarity; 
r (94)=. 31 for repair, ps <. 01). All three subscales were positively related to self-esteem. 
Salovey et al. (2002) also examined the relationship between PEI and reactions to 
stress. Participants agreed to perform laboratory tasks such as puzzles and serial 
subtraction. The stress level of participants was influenced by unrealistic time constraints 
on assigned tasks given by the experimenter. They found that mood repair is associated 
with psychological changes reflecting adaptive coping with stress. Also, mood repair was 
associated with lower levels of passive coping and greater levels of active coping. Skill at 
mood repair was also correlated with lower levels of rumination, a construct that has been 
linked to physiological reactivity and poor health outcomes (Pennebaker, 1995). With 
respect to physiological stress reactivity, PEI was correlated with cortisol as well as 
cardiovascular responses to stress. In particular, increased attention to mood was related 
to more adaptive (lowered) physiological responses to stress. These findings suggest that 
psychophysiological responses to stress may be one potential mechanism underlying the 
relationship between emotional functioning and health. Similarly, Rude and McCarthy 
(2003) found that when compared to non-depressed individuals, depressed individuals 
scored significantly lower on the attention and clarity scales of the TMMS. Although the 
TMMS has yet to be used in a psychotherapy setting, as in the present experiment, it 
appears to be related to psychological well being and psychological responses to stress.  
EI and Counseling
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The author of the present paper purposes that emotional intelligence is an 
important individual difference variable in environments such as therapy that require the 
use of emotion. Clients may come to therapy with a wide array of problems, yet to some 
degree, all problems are emotional in nature in that they require emotional information
and regulation to solve. As Greenberg (2002), founder of Emotion-Focused Therapy 
writes, “why do people have emotions, and what should they do with them? They have 
them because emotions are crucial to survival, communication, and problem solving. 
Emotions are signals, ones worth listening to” (p.11). Therapy is the process of 
uncovering and listening to emotional information, and then using that information to 
work through conflicts in one’s self and in one’s relationships. Thus, I proposed that 
emotional intelligence is important to the therapeutic process, in particular transference 
and insight, and session outcome. Little research has been conducted examining the 
relationship between EI, insight, and outcome. However, research involving a related 
construct to EI, psychological mindedness, helps guide and support the hypotheses 
outlined in this paper.
Psychological Mindedness: Insight and Outcome
Psychological Mindedness (PM). Originally formulated in the psychoanalytic literature, 
PM has been used as a selection criteria for patients suitable for psychoanalysis (Taylor, 
1995) and is also considered a desirable outcome of psychoanalysis (Appelbaum, 1973). 
In line with the psychoanalytic core belief that insight is the catalyst of behavior change, 
Abbelbaum (1973) defined PM as a “person’s ability to see relationships among 
thoughts, feelings, and actions, with the goal of learning the meanings and causes of his 
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experiences and behavior” (p.36).  In other words, PM is the ability to reach insight, or a 
mediator of change in the psychoanalytic process. To Appelbaum, PM requires 
intellectual and affective reflection about psychological processes, relationships, and 
meanings. However, Hall (1992) revised Appelbaum’s definition of PM by separating 
intellectual from affective PM. She proposed that accurate PM is contributed to and 
limited by intellectual and affective PM. McCallum and Piper (1990) defined PM in line 
with their psychoanalytic predecessors, as the “ability to identify dynamic (intrapsychic) 
components and to relate them to a person’s difficulties” (p.412). The authors mentioned 
above, focus on understanding pathology from the psychoanalytic perspective when 
defining PM. On the other hand, Grant (2001) writes that the interest and ability to 
understand the meaning of one’s behavior is not only important to psychodynamic 
therapies, but also to contemporary cognitive and behavioral therapies (Beck & Emery, 
1985). Grant (2001) defines PM as a “form of metacognition: a predisposition to engage 
in acts of affective and intellectual inquiry into how and why oneself and others behave, 
think, and feel the way that they do” (p. 12).
 Grant proposes that researchers operationalize PM by measuring the extent to 
which one engages in reflective acts of psychological inquiry and one’s level of insight. 
Grant’s operationalization of PM highlights an inconsistency in the PM literature: is PM 
the same construct as insight, or is insight the product of PM (Appelbaum, 1973)? 
Through measuring PM by assessing a client’s level of insight, we equate PM to insight, 
and the distinction becomes meaningless. The literature differs, as PM is sometimes 
considered to be a product of the therapeutic process, equivalent to insight, or a means to 
achieve insight. While clinicians may be able to see psychological mindedness, 
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researchers do not have an established empirical method of assessing it. Likewise, 
researchers have yet to empirically test the theoretical assumption that PM predicts 
insight. To address this gap in the literature concerning predictor variables of insight, I 
hypothesize that emotional intelligence, a similar construct to PM, predicts insight in 
therapy. On the other hand, psychological mindedness may be the therapeutic process 
ultimately arriving at insight.
PM and EI. In the Handbook of Emotional Intelligence, McCallum and Piper 
(2000) compare psychological mindedness to emotional intelligence along four 
dimensions: whether it is a good thing, whether it is a means to an end, whether it can be 
developed, and whether it focuses on the self or the other. However, the authors compare 
PM to a mixed model of EI. They define EI “to be a general construct encompassing 
emotional, personal, and social abilities that influence one’s overall capability to 
effectively cope with environmental demands and pressures” (p.123). In contrast, this 
paper compares PM to an ability model of EI (Mayer & Salovey, 1990). I purpose that 
PM and EI, while distinct constructs, are similar in nature. Thus, since PM has been 
linked to insight and outcome theoretically and somewhat empirically, it is reasonable to 
draw a similar link between EI, insight, and session outcome. 
Self vs. Other. Does PM include the ability to understand the underlying dynamics 
of the self and the other, or solely of the self? Does PM of the self involve the same 
process as PM of the other? Appelbaum (1973) and Baekeland and Lundwall (1975) both 
define PM in terms of understanding the self. McCallum and Piper (1997) propose that 
PM toward the self involves a different process than PM toward others because the 
acquisition of self-knowledge can be impeded by dynamic defenses. On the other hand, 
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Grant (2001) argues that the psychological mechanisms mediating behavior in oneself is 
not significantly different then those in others. Thus, Grant suggests that psychological 
insights into the self are related to those of others. He argues that individuals apply 
information they learn about themselves to others, and vice versa (Bandura, 1977). 
According to the EI ability model (Mayer & Salovey, 1990), EI involves the ability to 
reason about and from emotions in the self and in the other, similar to certain theories of 
PM.  
Skill vs. Predisposition. An inconsistency that has plagued the EI literature is 
whether EI is a skill, i.e., an intelligence, or a predisposition, i.e., a measure of 
personality (Mayer et al., 2001). Likewise, it is inconsistent across the various definitions 
of PM, whether or not the construct is a skill or a predisposition (Grant, 2001). A skill is 
a capacity or ability to perform complex, well organized patterns of behavior (Grant, 
2001, p.11.) On the other hand, a predisposition, preference, desire, or tendency are all 
states in which the performance of a specific behavior is likely to occur because one has 
both the ability and the motivation (Grant, 2001, p.11). Grant (2001) argues that PM is a 
predisposition; it is found in clients who are motivated to understand what lies beneath a 
person's behavior, and who can accurately do so because they possess a fundamental 
ability. However, intelligence captures one’s natural ability, and it does not take into 
account one’s motivations or preferences. Thus, while PM may be a predisposition, EI is 
a skill. 
Correlates of EI and PM. Although there is no literature directly comparing PM 
and EI, there is literature to suggest that the two constructs predict the same or similar 
constructs, suggesting that they may similarly influence therapy process variables, 
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specifically insight and outcome. Mayer et al. (2002) found significant correlations 
between EI and a number of variables that resemble the factors of PM, as suggested by 
Lumley and Shill (2002).  They performed a factor analysis on the Psychological 
Mindedness Scale (PMS; 2002) and found two main factors and a set of lower order 
factors. The two main factors were belief in the benefits of discussing one’s problems and 
access to feelings. Mayer et al. (2002) found a significant correlation between positive 
sharing, which is similar to “belief in the benefits of discussing one’s problems,” and EI, 
r=. 26, p<. 01, effect size =  .07. In addition, Mayer et al. (2000) found a low, yet 
significant, correlation between numbers of psychotherapy sessions, which could be a 
product of the “belief in the benefits of discussing one’s feelings,” and the understanding 
emotions branch of EI, r= .14, p<. 05, effect size = .02. The understanding emotions
subscale of the MSCEIT is similar to the clarity of emotions subscale of the TMMS. The 
“access to feelings” factor of the PMS resembles the perceiving emotions branch of the 
MSCEIT and the attending to emotions domain of the TMMS. In addition, Mayer et al. 
(2002) found a moderate but significant correlation between sensitivity, which is similar 
to access to feelings, and EI, r=. 22. P<. 01, effect size = .05.
Lower order factors of the PMS include: willingness to discuss problems with 
others, interests in meaning and motivation of own and others behavior, and openness to 
change. The first of these lower order factors, “willingness to discuss problems with 
others,” is similar to positive sharing that is significantly correlation with EI, r=. 26, p<. 
01, effect size = .07 (Mayer et al., 2002). The second of the lower order factors, “interest 
in own and others behavior,” is similar to the understanding emotions branch of EI. Both 
involve the ability to understand how emotions operate in the context of life 
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circumstances. Lastly, Mayer et al. (2002) also found that the final lower order factor of 
the PMS, “openness to change,” is not significantly related to EI. This finding is in 
accordance with Mayer and Salovey’s (2002) argument that EI is distinct from 
personality; openness to change is a personality trait. PM and EI are both individual 
difference variables concerning the ability and/or the desire to understand and use 
emotions. As the literature suggests that PM predicts insight and the outcome of therapy, 
I hypothesized that, given the theoretical and empirical similarities between EI and PM, 
EI would also predict insight and session outcome. 
PM and Outcome. The concept of PM originated in the psychoanalytic literature 
as a mean for clinicians to assess clients’ suitability for psychoanalysis (Taylor, 1995). 
Does this client possess the ability and the desire to achieve insight? Some 
psychodynamic clinicians may ask, does this client possess the ability and the desire to 
gain insight into the transference? A long time assumption of psychoanalysis is that 
insight is the cornerstone of structural change (Crits-Cristoph, Barber, Miller, & Bebe, 
1993). In other words, insight precipitates symptom reduction, for example, transference. 
Furthermore, PM is considered to be a client characteristic that will predict the insight 
necessary for change to occur within the patient (Appelbaum, 1973). Similarly, the 
present paper hypothesized that EI, a comparable construct to PM, would predict the 
level of insight, transference, and session outcome. 
PM is significantly related to constructs typically associated with a successful 
outcome of therapy. Empirical findings suggest that PM is significantly related to 
motivation for psychotherapy (e.g., Rosenbaum & Horowitz, 1983; Sifneos, 1968), ego 
functioning (Conte, Buckley, Dicard, & Karasu, 1995), and a subjective sense of well 
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being in a non-patient population (Trudeau & Reich, 1995). Also, PM has been shown to 
have a positive correlation with the number of psychotherapy sessions a patient will 
attend (Conte, Plutchik, Jung, Picard, Karasu, & Lotterman, 1990). The findings reported 
above, suggest a significant relationship between PM and variables typically associated 
with a favorable outcome. 
Conte et al. (1990) found a direct relationship between PM and counseling 
outcome. They distributed a 45-item self-report questionnaire called the Psychological 
Mindedness Scale (PM) to a large outpatient clinic that provided primarily 
psychodynamically oriented individual treatment. The PM scores of 44 patients, who 
attended a median of 15 sessions, were correlated with several outcome measures. The 
data suggests that PM is basically unrelated to clients’ functioning and psychological 
symptoms and problems at intake to the clinic. However, a high level of PM at intake was 
significantly related to improved psychosocial functioning at discharge, as measured by 
the Global Assessment Scale (GAS), r= .33, P<. 05, effect size = .11. Also, a high level 
of PM at intake negatively correlated with symptomology at discharge, as measured by 
the Psychiatric Outpatient Rating Scale (PORS), r = -. 37, p <. 05, effect size = .14. This 
study suggests that initial PM has some power to predict symptomology at outcome. In 
addition, the Conte et al. (1990) findings were consistent with the results of Abramowitz 
and Abramowitz (1974), who also compared initial PM to outcome in insight oriented 
treatment. 
Piper, Joyce, McCallum, and Azim (1998) used a randomized clinical trial sample 
to investigate the efficacy of interpretative and supportive forms of short-term individual 
psychotherapy and the interaction of each form with the patients quality of object 
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relations and psychological mindedness. This study used an outpatient sample in short-
term individual psychotherapy. There were 144 completers of psychotherapy, 27 drop 
outs and 8 experienced manual guided therapists. Results indicate that PM predicts 
outcome in supportive and interpretive therapies. However, while both groups improved, 
there were no significant differences between how much they improved. In this study, 
PM predicted outcome for all patients on measures of interpersonal distress, r = -. 26, p <. 
01, effect size = .07, sexual functioning, r =-. 17, p <. 05, effect size = .03, anxiety r = - . 
17, p <. 05, effect size, .03, general symptomatic distress, r= -. 26, p <. 01, effect size = 
.07, life satisfaction, r = -. 21, p <. 05, effect size = .04, and maladaptive defenses, r= -. 
17, P<. 05, effect size = .03.
Strengths of this experiment include the randomized clinical trial design, wherein 
participants were randomly assigned to the supportive or interpretative form of therapy. 
A comprehensive set of outcome criteria was employed, focusing on more then symptom 
reduction. For example, some outcome measures employed in this study include: the 
inventory of interpersonal problems, beck depression inventory, and the social adjustment 
interview. Therapists were trained to follow specific manuals in treating patients to 
ensure that the same techniques characterized supportive vs. insight oriented therapies. 
The sessions were videotaped and checked by raters for adherence to the manual. Some 
limitations of the study include the use of the same therapist conducting supportive and 
interpretive therapies. Although, raters for adherence to the manuals checked therapist’s 
techniques in session, techniques do not account for the personality of the therapist and 
the sort of relationship a therapist tends to form with his or her clients. In addition, 
because the treatment groups were not compared to a no-treatment group, efficacy cannot 
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be established. Theoretically speaking, PM may prove to be a better predicator of insight 
then of outcome. PM involves an understanding on an affective level of the emotions and 
thoughts that guide behavior. However, affective understanding of the self may not 
necessarily lead to symptom reduction, or life satisfaction, for many people, especially if 
individuals feel overwhelmed or depressed by a clearer picture. In the long run, EI may 
prove to be a better predictor of outcome then PM because it involves the ability to 
understand and manage emotions, whereas PM solely refers to understanding emotions. 
Overall, the literature on psychological mindedness shares the following 
limitations. First, the lack of a consistent definition of PM may lead to conflicting results 
among studies. Second, most studies on PM are carried out in psychodynamically 
oriented therapies. However, PM is an important client characteristic in therapies of 
various theoretical modalities (Grant, 2001). Third, most of the PM literature draws from 
the outpatient population to form a sample. However, this limits the generalizability of 
findings in this area to other client populations. Fourth, the lack of empirical studies 
comparing measures of PM to measures of insight is surprising given the theoretical 
relationship they share. Fifth, studies involving PM and counseling outcome yield small 
effect sizes. Lastly, more follow up studies need to be conducted when analyzing the 
affect of PM on counseling outcome. In spite of these limitations, the literature suggests 
that PM predicts some variance in outcome. Theoretically, insight mediates the 
relationship between PM and outcome. Thus, given the theoretical similarities between 




I find it very satisfying when I can be real, when I can be close to whatever it is going on 
within me. I like it when I can listen to myself. To really know what I am experiencing in 
the moment is by no means an easy thing . . . 
- Carl Rogers, A Way of Being
Definition. To the ancient Greeks, the ability to know oneself was considered to be a 
major ethical goal. Centuries later, Freud redefined what it meant to know thyself, when 
he proposed the concept of unconscious ideas and motivations. He emphasized the 
healing affect of gaining knowledge or insight into one’s experience. Crits-Cristoph, 
Barber, Miller, and Beebe (1993) remark that since Freud’s time, “insight has commonly 
been perceived as the cornerstone of the psychoanalytic theory of structural change” 
(p.408). Specifically, Freud expected insight to result in a more integrated mature ego 
structure that should, inturn, result in symptom reduction (Kivlighan, Multon, & Patton, 
2000). 
Although definitions of insight vary, most authors agree that insight involves a 
conscious awareness of some of the wishes, defenses, and compromises (Brenner, 1982; 
Wallerstein & Robbins, 1956) that result in preventing one’s psychological development 
and potential. In the literature, authors have distinguished between emotional and 
intellectual insight. Strachey (1934) defined emotional insight as a successful 
intervention that results in symptom change, while intellectual insight is a rationalization 
that can never result in symptomatic change. Different definitions of insight vary in 
scope; solely encompassing client knowledge into the therapeutic relationship to 
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encompassing all client knowledge of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors in and outside of 
therapy. For example, analysts often refer to insight as the client's understanding of the 
transference relationship. Kris (1956) described insight in the context of transference, in 
what he referred to as the “good hour.” Ferenczi (1950) and Rank (1936) also 
emphasized the significance of the transference relationship in shaping interpretations 
delivered by the therapist. To be helpful to the client, they stressed that these
interpretations must be emotionally meaningful to the client. On the contrary, in a recent 
study, Gelso, Kivlighan, Wine, Jones, and Friedman (1997) defined insight more broadly, 
including more client material than his or her understanding of the transference. They 
defined insight as,  “the extent to which the client displays accurate understanding of the 
material being explored. Understanding may be of the relationship, client’s functioning 
outside of counseling, or aspects of the client’s dynamics and behavior” (p.212). Similar 
to Gelso et al. (1997), the study at hand operationalized insight with a wider scope, 
looking at anything the client may have learned or realized in a session.
Correlates of the Level of Insight.   A few studies have examined the relationship 
between insight and general adjustment. Mann and Mann (1959) operationalized insight 
as the amount of congruence between the way one is perceived by others and the way one 
sees oneself. In a sample of 96 students, the authors found no relationship between 
insight and adjustment. Perhaps, if the authors operationalized insight as the client’s level 
of conscious awareness of internal conflicts, they would have found different results. On 
the other hand, Kivlighan et al. (2000) found a direct relationship between the client’s 
level of insight and counseling outcome. Gelso et al. (1997) did not find a significant 
main effect for insight on counseling outcome. While Gelso et al. (1997) did not find a 
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main effect for insight and outcome, they did find a moderating effect of insight on 
transference and outcome (Gelso et al., 1997). These studies support Greenson’s (1967) 
hypothesis that client insight will reduce symptoms. If client insight reduces symptoms, 
then we would expect to find a significant relationship between insight and counseling 
outcome. Thus, it is essential that we investigate predictors of the level of insight in 
therapy, so that clinicians have “markers” of how the therapeutic process is proceeding.  
Insight and Outcome. The relationship between the amount of insight and 
counseling outcome has not been intensively studied (Kivlighan, 2002). O’Conner et al. 
(1994) examined the course of insight in four sixteen-session therapies, and the 
relationship between the amount of insight in psychotherapy and treatment outcome. 
Specifically, they found that the higher the average level of insight across therapy, the 
more successful the outcome. In addition, O’Conner et al. (1994) found that the level of 
insight over time formed a quadratic pattern that was statistically significant. In their 
sample, the amount of client insight tended to start relatively high, decrease toward the 
middle of therapy, and increase toward the end of treatment. 
In O’Conner et al. (1994), three raters assessed the level of client insight. While 
raters lend a more objective measure of insight then utilizing the therapist or client’s 
vantagepoint, the internal reliability of raters in the study ranged from a low alpha of .60 
to a good alpha of .88. Another potential limitation of the study lies in the way in which 
the authors defined insight, according to Weiss’s Control Mastery Theory. According to 
Mastery Theory, insight is a function of clients’ knowledge of his or her “unconscious 
plan.” Limiting insight to the client’s awareness of ‘the plan’, assumes that it is present. 
Also, the definition excludes clients’ understanding of other important feelings and 
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behaviors. Nonetheless, this study suggested that client insight is an important process 
variable that affects the course and outcome of therapy. 
In another study, Luborsky, Crits-Cristoph, Mintz, and Auerbach (1988) 
operationalized insight as the client’s awareness of core conflicts in different 
relationships. They found that some aspects of insight (self-understanding about the 
counselor and self-understanding about significant others) correlate with counseling 
outcome. In the Grenyer and Luborsky (1996) study, changes in the level of mastery over 
the course of therapy were related to observer, counselor, and client ratings of outcome. 
Grenyer and Luborsky (1996) define mastery as, “the acquisition of emotional self-
control and intellectual self-understanding in the context of interpersonal relationships” 
(p. 411). The investigators’ use of multi points of view concerning counseling outcome 
lends more perspective to a potentially subjective measure and increases the validity of 
the results. In their study, change in mastery was determined by calculating a residual 
gain score for mastery, using mastery ratings taken from early and late in treatment. 
Kivlighan et al. (2000) point to Grenyer and Luborsky’s (1996) use of residual gain 
scores for operationalizing changes in mastery, as an advance over previous studies that 
used a simple correlational approach to linking process and outcome (as criticized by 
Gottman and Markman, 1978). However, this approach is still a correlational approach. 
An alternative to the traditional correlational approach involves the use of time-series 
analyses. As such, Kivlighan et al. (2000) examined the time-ordered relationship 
between insight and symptom reduction.
Kivlighan et al. (2000) hypothesized that insight increases linearly across time in 
psychotherapy. They also predicted that an increase in the level of insight would 
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precipitate a decrease in the level of target (client) symptom complaints. This study 
addresses an inconsistency in the literature concerning the nature of insight. Wallerstein 
and Robbins (1956) stated that insight could be a (a) precondition of symptom change, 
(b) a direct result of symptom change, (c) a cause of symptom change, or (d) a correlate 
of symptom change. Until the Kivlighan et al. (2000) study, research has provided little 
information about the development of insight, and the relationship between symptom 
reduction and insight (Kivlighan et al., 2000). 
Kivlighan et al. (2000) measured insight with the Important Events Questionnaire 
(IEQ) and the Insight Rating Scale (IRS). The reliability of the IRS was excellent, alpha= 
.94. The interater reliability was also good, alpha= .89-. 85. Using these instruments the 
investigators found support for their initial hypotheses. No quadratic or cubic term was 
found for the progression of insight over time, and instead a linear trend emerged, 
contrary to the O'Conner et al. (1994) study. In addition, according to time-series 
analyses, an increase in client insight in session was followed by lower target complaint 
ratings in the following week. This finding is in accordance to psychoanalytic theory that 
predicts that once a client consciously understands his or her conflicts then symptoms 
reduce (Greenson, 1967). 
The Kivlighan et al. (2000) study replicates and extends the work of Grenyer and 
Luborsky (1996), using time-series analysis. Some potential limitations of the Kivlighan 
et al. (2000) study exist. Long term symptom reduction was not analyzed. Thus, we do 
not know whether an increase in insight precipitates long term decreases in symptom 
reduction. In addition, all clients received psychodynamic treatment. Thus, a subtle 
demand characteristic for insight may have existed. Lastly, Kivlighan et al. (2000) write 
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that given the empirical support for insight as an important precondition to therapeutic 
gain, future research must examine client variables that may predict insight. Accordingly, 
the present study looked at the relationship between the client variable, emotional 
intelligence, and the level of insight. 
Certain limitations are found across empirical studies on insight. First, many 
studies use a small sample, such as O’Conner et al. (1994) and Gelso et al. (1997). A 
small sample size limits the power of a study. Second, most studies involving insight are 
correlational since one cannot manipulate insight. However, more sophisticated statistical 
approaches may be used over simple correlations, as shown in Kivlighan et al. (2000). 
Lastly, future studies need to examine whether different patterns of insight exist over 
time for successful and nonsuccessful cases of psychotherapy. This may reveal why 
O’Conner et al. (1994) and Kivlighan et al. (2000) found conflicting patterns of insight.
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Transference
When a person’s relationship to a memory, to his family, or to all of humanity changes, 
that person’s emotions will change as well. For example, a person who recalls a happy 
childhood memory may find that the world appears brighter and more joyous.
- Bowers, The Unconscious Reconsidered
Transference, which seems to be ordained to be the greatest obstacle to psychoanalysis, 
becomes its most powerful ally, if its presence can be detected
 each time and explained to the patient.
- Freud, Analysis of a Case of Hysteria
Definition. From a strictly classical sense, transference is a client distortion that involves 
a reexperiencing of Oedipal issues in the therapeutic relationship. Far from the classical 
movement led by Freud, the modern constructivist position emphasizes intersubjective 
thought by defining transference as an unconscious organizing process to which both the 
client and therapist contribute (Stolorow, 1991). The definition of transference used in 
this study is offered by Gelso and Hayes (1998) who advocate a position that incorporates 
both the position of distortion in the classical definition and the phenomenon of 
intersubjectivity emphasized by the intersubjectivists. Specifically, they define 
transference as, “ the client’s experience of the therapist that is shaped by the client’s own 
psychological structures and past and involves displacement, onto the therapist, of 
feelings, attitudes and behaviors belonging rightfully in earlier significant relationships” 
(p.51). Because the Gelso and Hayes (1998) conception of transference is incorporated in 
this study, it is important to examine some of its implications.
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First, in line with the intersubjective view, transference can be seen as an 
unconscious organizing activity (Gelso & Hayes, 1998). Meaning that the client 
assimilates the therapeutic relationship into the thematic structures of his or her personal 
subjective world (Stolorow, 1991). According to Luborsky and Crits- Cristoph’s (1990) 
work on the Core Conflictual Relationship Theme, most clients play out a significant 
relationship theme, or pattern, that is learned early in life and that reflects unresolved 
conflicts in early relationships (Grenyer & Luborsky, 1996). This theme manifests itself 
in multiple ways in the therapeutic relationship. A second aspect of the Gelso and Hayes 
(1998) definition of transference, includes a repetition within the therapy relationship of 
past issues with significant others, as well as a repetition of past attempts to achieve 
secure relationships. As a child, we learn certain relationship patterns, themes, and 
defenses in an effort to achieve a sense of security within dangerous or uncertain 
relationships. As Gelso and Hayes (1998) write, “the patterns did make sense in an earlier 
time and place; they protected the vulnerable child and created security to the extent 
possible, given the traumatizing or excessively frustrating situation and the child’s 
naturally limited psychic tools” (p. 52).
A third aspect of the Gelso and Hayes (1998) conception of transference is that 
the therapist is always involved, to some degree, in the development of the client’s 
transference. Classical psychoanalysis calls upon therapists to be as ambiguous as 
possible, leaving their personality at the door and presenting themselves as a blank screen 
onto which the client’s transference can develop in it’s most pure form. However, Gelso 
and Hayes (1998) assert that “all of what the therapist does, including being ambiguous, 
influences the transference- the feeling and attitudes that are projected onto him or her” 
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(p.52). The therapist’s and the client’s contribution to the content and magnitude of the
transference is intricately interwoven.
A fourth and final point of the Gelso and Hayes (1998) definition of transference 
is that it always involves a distortion from early caregivers to the therapist, and that this 
distortion is almost never straightforward. Distortion may be a “simple” substitute where 
the client experiences the therapist as the controlling mother or passive father. However, 
the client can also project onto the therapist, aspects of character that the client wishes his 
or her caregiver(s) posses. He or she may recreate a situation where the client reenacts his 
or her parent’s behavior, placing the therapist in the role of child. These are just a few 
examples of the complex ways in which transference can emerge in the therapeutic 
relationship (Gelso & Hayes, 1998). 
It is important to distinguish between the level of transference and the content of 
transference. The content refers to the number of ways in which the transference can 
manifest itself in interpersonal relationships. Luborsky and colleagues developed the 
Core Conflictual Relationship Theme measure (CCRT; Crits-Cristoph & Luborsky, 1990) 
to assess the content of transference, and it’s effect on the therapeutic process and 
outcome. However, relatively few empirical studies have addressed the influence that the 
level of transference exerts on the therapeutic process and outcome. To address this gap 
in the literature, the study at hand investigated plausible predictors of the amount of 
transference in psychotherapy and it’s effect on session outcome. 
Transference in Context.    Freud called attention to the inevitability of 
transference in the therapeutic relationship. He believed that through the analysts’ 
transference interpretations, the patient would come to “ a sense of conviction of the 
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validity of the connections which have been constructed during analysis” (Freud, 1905, 
p.14). In other words, to work through the transference, the client must understand its 
content and origin. In this sense, transference is inextricably linked to insight and 
counseling outcome. In fact, Grenyer and Luborsky (1996) define insight in terms of 
transference, or what they call the Core Conflictual Relationship Theme (CCRT). They 
define mastery as “the acquisition of emotional self-control and intellectual self-
understanding in the context of interpersonal relationships” (p.411). Psychoanalytic 
principle dictates that insight into the transference, or mastery of the CCRT, is related to 
counseling outcome since insight is thought to reduce symptoms (Greenson, 1967). 
Although transference is traditionally associated with psychoanalytic therapy, it is a part 
of the therapeutic relationship regardless of the clinician’s theoretical orientation. As 
Gelso and Carter (1985) write, “ not only are we suggesting that transference reactions 
occur across theoretical persuasions, but that they occur regardless of the duration of 
treatment” (p. 169). 
Level (Amount) of Transference X Insight.  Gelso and Carter (1985) hypothesize 
that transference is always present in the therapeutic work and exerts a significant effect 
on treatment. However, they theorize that the impact of the amount of transference on 
counseling outcome is not in the form of a main effect. Rather, the direction and extent of 
the effects of transference on outcome depend on the degree of insight possessed by the 
client (Gelso & Carter, 1985). Gelso et al. (1997) empirically tested the transference X 
insight interaction hypothesis outlined in Gelso and Carter (1985). They hypothesized 
that transference was expected to have a positive influence on outcome under the 
conditions of high client insight, whereas the effect was theorized to be negative when 
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the client possessed little insight. In other words, in isolation, the amount of transference 
will not significantly impact counseling. However, when transference is placed in context 
with other therapeutic variables such as insight, it is a powerful predictor of counseling 
outcome. 
Gelso et al. (1997) offer the strongest empirical support for the transference X 
insight interaction on outcome hypothesis. Consistent with expectations, they found that 
transference ratings from the first session and first quarter of therapy were in all cases 
unrelated to the outcome measures. To test the transference X insight interaction 
hypothesis, the authors performed a hierarchical multiple regression analyses in which 
the transference term was added first, either the emotional or intellectual insight term 
second, and the interaction term last. The analyses were performed for first session and 
first quarter data. The authors found transference and insight to be unrelated. Thus, 
problems with multicollinearity between the predictors were unlikely. The F ratios for 
multiple correlation were nonsignificant when intellectual insight was in the transference 
X insight interaction, F=1.51, p>. 01. However, these F rations were significant when 
emotional insight was a part of the interaction, F=4.17, p<. 01. In other words, Gelso et 
al. (1997) found that transference and insight do not have a main effect on outcome. 
However, together transference and insight predict significant variance in outcome. 
The properties of the measures used in Gelso et al. (1997) point to some strengths 
and possible limitations of the study. The internal consistency of the transference 
measure was good, alpha = .81. It appears that the measure was reliable. However, 
measures of transference amount may be less stable in general because it varies across 
sessions. The stability of the two insight measures is adequate, alpha =. 72 for intellectual 
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insight, and alpha = .77 for emotional insight. The client outcome measure had very good 
reliability, alpha = .89. The transference and insight measure was a single item measure. 
Although adequate reliability was found, multi-item measures are more desirable. One 
take home message of Gelso et al. (1997) is to conduct research looking at the amount of 
transference in context of other process variables, such as insight.
 The transference X insight interaction hypothesis espoused by Gelso and Carter 
(1985) and Gelso et al. (1997) has been previously supported. Graff and Luborsky (1977) 
found a transference X insight interaction effect on outcome in a small sample study. 
Similarly, Gelso et al. (1991) found support for the interaction effect on the outcome of a 
single session, during the course of open-ended therapy. In addition, Gelso, Hill, Mohr, 
Rochlen, and Zack (1999) used the consensual qualitative research method to address 
questions about the therapist’s perceptions of transference. Psychodynamic therapists 
were asked to retrospectively answer questions regarding transference for patients in long 
term therapy. In this study, insight was hypothesized to be a moderator of transference 
and outcome. They found that therapists recalled a linearly increasing pattern of insight to 
be a key feature in resolving the transference and predicting a successful outcome. 
The Course of Transference.   Psychodynamic theories across the board are 
fundamentally about changing the client’s transference pattern (Kivlighan, 2000). Insight 
into the transference is theorized to reduce symptoms and improve interpersonal patterns. 
The research, although in it’s beginning stages, suggests that the course of transference 
can predict successful from nonsucccessful therapies. Graff and Luborsky (1977) found, 
in contrast to their expectations, that in successful long term psychoanalyses, transference 
actually increased throughout the therapeutic work, whereas in less successful cases, 
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transference remained stable. The authors postulated that transference increased in a 
linear fashion in successful cases because in the therapy hour transference is encouraged. 
However, they reasoned that outside the therapeutic setting, transference was increasingly 
brought under the control of the analysand’s insight. 
Instead of examining the pattern of the amount of transference over time, some 
researchers have studied how the content of transference changes over time in 
psychotherapy. Crits-Cristoph and Luborsky (1990) examined how clients’ Core Conflict 
Relationship Theme (CCRT) changes across treatment. They based their study on the 
assumption that clients enter therapy with maladaptive relationship patterns that repeat 
themselves in a number of relationships, and that therapy helps clients change these 
maladaptive relationship patterns. The authors found that clients have the same 
constellation of wishes at the end of treatment as they did at the beginning. However, the 
clients’ expectations for others’ responses and the clients’ responses to the self did 
change by the end of treatment. Crits-Christoph and Luborsky (1990) suggest that their 
results support Schlessinger and Robin’s (1975) view of change in psychodynamic 
therapy. They argue that the form and content of a client’s transference remains 
unchanged. Instead, the change is in the client’s reaction to and understanding of his or 
her transference pattern.
Patton, Kivlighan, and Multon (1997) examined the unfolding of the amount of 
transference in 20 sessions of psychodynamic treatment. They found a low-high-low 
pattern of transference expressions across twenty sessions. Gelso et al. (1997) replicated 
the Patton et al. (1997) findings with a twist. They followed a group of counselors with 
various theoretical orientations during time limited treatment. Similar to past findings, 
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successful and unsuccessful outcomes were a function of different patterns of 
transference over time. However, in the Gelso et al. (1997) study, it was the unsuccessful 
cases that exhibited a linear increase, whereas the successful cases had a low-high-low 
pattern. Gelso and Hayes (1998) propose that there is a type of treatment by pattern of 
transference interaction. In treatments that seek to analyze the transference, such as long 
term psychodynamic work, transference becomes increasingly available for the work 
(Graff & Luborsky, 1977). However, in short-term work, it would be unwise to bring to 
the surface too much transference. There is not enough time in brief therapy to bring an 
increasing amount of transference under the control of insight. Thus, a low-high-low 
pattern of transference emerges for successful cases in short-term work. The amount of 
transference seems to be a useful predictor of counseling outcome when traced over the 
course of treatment. 
In examining the literature on transference it appears that certain limitations 
generally arise. First, the therapist completes most measures of transference. Thus, these 
measures capture solely the therapist’s vantagepoint of the client’s transference. While 
therapists’ ratings of client transference are certainly important, they may be biased since 
transference is a construct developed by clinicians. Second, the small sample size of most 
studies limits its power. For example, the small sample size in the Gelso et al. (1997) 
study may have contributed to the nonsignificance for insight and transference as a main 
effect. Lastly, most studies on transference are correlational. Thus, we cannot draw cause 
and effect inferences from the data. 
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Session Outcome
Session impact refers to a psychotherapy session’s immediate effects, including a 
participants’ evaluations of what happened and their post-session affective state (Stiles & 
Snow, 1984). Session impact is distinct from psychotherapy process and from long-term 
outcome (Stiles, Shapiro, & Firth-Cozens, 1990). However, Stiles and Snow (1984) argue 
that “incubation or cumulation” of the impact of many sessions should mediate the 
process-outcome relationship (p.59). Theorists from Allport (1946) to Rogers (1951, 
1959) have agreed that evaluation, meaning people’s positive or negative valence to 
events, is adaptive, automatic, and universal (Stiles, Reynolds, Hardy, Rees, Barkham, & 
Shapiro, 1994). Measures of session impact are concerned with clients’ internal reactions 
to sessions, which over time logically should influence the long term effects of treatment 
(Stiles et al., 1994). 
The Session Evaluation Questionnaire (SEQ; Stiles, 1980) measures the perceived 
value and power of a session, i.e., the depth, and the socio-emotional dimension that 
reflects the session’s perceived comfort, safety, and level of client distress, i.e., the 
smoothness. Depth and smoothness both appear desirable and likely to correlate 
positively with improvement (Stiles et al., 1990). Stiles et al. (1990) found that clients’ 
SEQ ratings averaged across each clients’ sessions did not show a significant relationship 
with measures of treatment outcome. However, external raters’ ratings of session 
smoothness were significantly correlated with client improvement on several measures. 
In addition, SEQ ratings of one of two principal therapists were strongly correlated with 
client improvement on self-report measures. This study asked clients and therapists to 
complete the Session Evaluation Scale (SES; Hill & Kellems, 2002). Single session 
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evaluations will most likely have little predictive power for outcome. However, session 
outcome taps into a client’s immediate and automatic “gut” reactions of a therapy 
session. 
Integration of the Variables
Emotional Intelligence (EI) and Transference.
The author purposed that emotional intelligence is inversely related to 
transference, a fundamental component of all relationships (see Gelso & Hayes, 1998; 
Grenyer & Luborsky, 1996). “EI begins with the idea that emotions contain information 
about relationships” (Mayer et al., 2001). Relationships, actual, remembered, or even 
imagined, are accompanied by signals that take the form of emotions (Mayer et al., 
2001). For example, a person that is viewed as threatening is feared. It is essential to 
survival to feel fear in response to a threatening person so that we know to prepare for 
fight or flight. In other words, emotions experienced in response to others guide adaptive 
behavior. However, what happens when a person does not experience appropriate 
emotions in relationships? For example, if a cave man feared big and small animals alike, 
he would never possess the courage to hunt animals for food. As social relationships 
become more complex and necessary for our emotional and physical “survival,” 
experiencing appropriate emotions in response to others becomes an increasingly difficult 
yet necessary skill to possess. Theoretically, emotional intelligence deals with the 
construction of appropriate emotional responses in relationships; it is the ability to read 
the emotional cues of others and to respond appropriately (Mayer & Salovey, 1995).
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According to the theory of transference, there is a component in every 
relationship that is “inappropriate,” “unreal,” or “irrational” (Gelso & Hayes, 1998). To 
some degree, human beings experience emotional reactions in response to others that do 
not fit the reality of a particular relationship. Rather, these emotions are responses learned 
in childhood in an effort to cope with trauma in family relationships. The transference 
phenomenon is highlighted in the therapeutic relationship where the relationship is 
explored and analyzed. In other words, clients hold feelings toward the therapist that in 
reality are not direct responses to the therapist but to the client’s caregivers. For example, 
a client may love his or her therapist and idealize him or her to be everything that the 
client’s own parents were not. To the degree that transference involves “unrealistic,” or 
“inappropriate” emotions in relationships, EI involves the capacity to experience 
appropriate emotional reactions given a particular context.
A skill hypothesized to help work through transference, is the ability to construct 
adaptive assumptions about emotions: when to feel what, and in response to whom? 
Mayer and Salovey (1995) argue that people hold certain assumptions about how one 
experiences emotions and how adaptive they are. These assumptions form an emotional 
model that guides the construction and regulation of emotions on the high, low, and 
nonconscious levels of awareness. Furthermore, Mayer and Salovey (1995) purpose that 
individuals adhere to a model of emotional functioning that varies in its consistency and 
adaptive value. More specifically, the authors argue that a relatively adaptive emotional 
model includes the assumption that, “the best emotions to feel depend upon the 
situation.” 
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The assumption that one’s emotions in a given moment should be based on the 
relevant and accurate information of the moment is not new to philosophy and 
psychology. Aristotle believed that good judgement requires a person to understand the 
normative emotional response in a given situation and then to deviate from it sensibly 
according to the needs of the circumstances (322 B.C.E., cited in Mayer & Salovey, 
1995). Freud echoed Aristotle in his view that pleasure must balance itself with reality; 
emotional reactions must therefore be modulated to fit the context (Freud, 1920/1950, 
cited in Mayer & Salovey, 1995). Mayer and Salovey (1995) have taken this historical 
assumption about emotions and defined it as an ability, or type of intelligence.
Mayer and Salovey (1995) argue that emotional intelligence involves the ability 
to construct context specific emotions. On the contrary, transference involves emotional 
reactions in interpersonal relationships that do not take into account relevant and accurate 
information of a given context, or relationship. In other words, transference involves 
general emotional responses to others that occur regardless of contradictory evidence. For 
example, as a child, a particular client accurately perceived his father to be a threat, as he 
was emotionally and often physically abusive toward the family. As a result, as a child, 
this client feared his father and dove into physical and mental withdrawal to protect 
himself- an adaptive maneuver on the client's part at that moment in time. However, as an 
adult this client perceives all authority as threatening, and thus he intensely fears his boss, 
therapist, and in general all older men. This inappropriate fear has created conflict and 
tension in many of the client’s relationships, as highlighted in the therapy relationship.
Transference may be related to the knowledge-processing phase of intelligence. In 
this phase of EI, one remembers how one analyzed prior instances of feelings and then 
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uses this information as a source of knowledge to guide future actions (Mayer et al., 
2001). At times it may make sense to remember how one felt in past relationships, and 
then to use this memory as a guide in how to feel and act in future relationships. Salovey 
et al. (1995) write that when human beings come into contact with a stressful situation, 
affective memory structures are activated to guide the stress reaction. In other words, 
when confronted with a stressor, people unconsciously remember their emotional 
response to a similar past situation. This emotional schema is then used to interpret the 
stressor and the appropriate reaction to it. It is hypothesized that schemas of emotional 
responses to interpersonal relationships influence transference reactions. Schemas in 
general are developed to protect the organism and to establish automatic and appropriate 
responses to stressful situations. However, without the ability to construct context 
specific emotions, one is more likely to generalize emotional responses in one 
relationship to consequent relationships, even when the emotions no longer fit the 
context. Thus, since emotional intelligence involves the ability to construct emotions 
based on context specific, or relationship specific information, it was hypothesized that 
transference would be inversely related to it.
In addition, the author hypothesized that EI is inversely related to transference 
because EI involves the ability to manage or regulate emotions. Mayer et al. (2001) 
compare the ability to manage emotions to meta-intelligence, or the act of coming up 
with strategies for operating an intelligence to assist in different contexts of life. For a 
chess player, meta-intelligence involves visualizing his or her strategy in a chess game 
and the steps needed to get there. When an emotional problem is at hand, meta-
intelligence may involve the ability to visualize one’s strategy in managing emotions and 
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the steps, or defense mechanisms and/or coping strategies, needed to get there (Mayer et 
al., 2001). According to psychodynamic theories, defense mechanisms are necessary to 
manage our emotions; however, using them appropriately is a delicate balancing act.  A 
healthy ego establishes a working balance between defending against painful or traumatic 
emotions and letting them into consciousness. Transference is an example of a defense 
mechanism that usually blocks too much emotional information from awareness. 
To some degree, every child experiences trauma in his or her family of origin. 
However, the theory of emotional intelligence purposes that people possess varying 
abilities to manage that trauma, striking a healthy balance between defending and dealing 
with painful emotions (Mayer & Salovey, 1995). In other words, the ability to manage 
one’s emotions involves reaching a balance between healthy defense mechanisms and 
self-awareness. Transference is a defense mechanism that creates conflict and distress in 
clients’ relationships relative to the degree it is expressed. It is one way of dealing with 
painful emotions associated with childhood; however, it may not be the most adaptive 
one. It is hypothesized that the ability to mange emotions, balancing awareness with 
healthy coping strategies and defense mechanisms, predicts the level of transference. In 
other words, when carrying painful early experiences, it is essential to the quality of one’s 
relationships and psyche, to visualize strategies other than transference that help manage 
pain and trauma. 
The ability to manage one’s emotions may help prevent transference before it is 
formed, and also diminish transference once it is already in existence. Throughout the 
therapy process, specifically in psychodynamic therapies, painful early memories are 
explored and brought into consciousness. Clients that do not posses the ability to manage 
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these emotions on a conscious level will be more likely to repress or become 
overwhelmed by the insights gained in therapy. If it is the goal of therapy to gain insight 
into the transference so that the client may understand and mange it, then one must posses 
the psychic tools to cope with the pain that comes with awareness. The ability to “hold” 
insight and to use it to make changes in one’s life may involve the ability to mange 
emotions in addition to understanding them. As Greenberg (2002) writes, “it is not 
insight alone that leads to change. Rather, once articulated, these views of the self, world, 
and other can be changed by accessing alternate experiences to undo them” (p.95). In 
summary, it was theorized that EI would predict the level of transference, as EI deals 
with the ability to construct context specific emotions and adaptively manage emotions.
EI, being a relatively new construct, has yet to find it’s way into counseling 
relationship and process research. Though the research is sparse, I will report research 
that suggests a relationship between EI, as measured by the MSCEIT unless otherwise 
specified, and transference. First, empathy was found to be significantly related to EI, r=. 
33, p< .01, effect size= 11% (Mayer et al., 2000). In addition, the attention subscale of 
the TMMS significantly correlates with empathy, r= .44, p< .001, effect size= .20 % 
(Salovey et al., 2002). In theory, transference can be viewed as a break in empathy. 
Transference is the act of displacing feelings onto another individual, rather than entering 
that individual’s internal world and subjective experience. However, one potential 
weakness to the Mayer et al. (2000) and the Salovey et al. (2002) experiments was the 
use of a self-report measure of empathy. With a self-report measure, it is impossible to 
know if the scores represent reality or the subjects’ perception. In the Mayer et al. (2000) 
study, the reliability for the empathy measure (Caruso & Mayer, 1999) was good, alpha=. 
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86. However, Cronbach’s alpha for the empathy measure in Salovey et al. (2002) was 
.74. In the same study (Mayer et al., 2000), parental warmth was compared to EI. 
Parental warmth was significantly related to EI, r=. 23, p<. 01, effect size = 5 %. Perhaps 
in the presence of parental warmth, negative transference would diminish in level, 
suggesting that EI would also be inversely related to negative transference since it is 
positively related to parental warmth. 
Salovey et al. (2002) found a significant relationship between interpersonal 
satisfaction and the clarity (r=.39) and repair (r=.31) subscales of the TMMS. The 
reliability of the Interpersonal Satisfaction Scale was only .67, which may decrease the 
magnitude of the correlations. Unconscious, unchecked, and unanalyzed transference is 
generally thought to hinder interpersonal satisfaction for it involves the repetition of 
unresolved conflict in relationships. Thus, interpersonal satisfaction would be expected to 
inversely relate to one’s level of transference. Given the relationship between emotional 
intelligence and interpersonal satisfaction, it is reasonable to suggest that transference is 
also related to emotional intelligence.
Lastly, Mayer and Geher (1996) found a significant negative relationship between 
EI and defensiveness, r= -.14, p<. 10, effect size = .02. Transference is a type of defense 
mechanism. However, .02 is an unacceptable effect size. The low effect size may have 
been due to the researchers’ choice in measures. Mayer and Geher (1996) used the 
Kohn’s Authoritarian-Rebellion Scale and the Malowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale
to measure defensiveness. However, neither scale is a measure of defensiveness. The 
findings cited above are inconclusive given certain methodological flaws and low effect 
60
sizes. Also, these studies involve variables that are plausibly related to transference; 
however, none of these studies involve transference itself.
Emotional Intelligence (EI) and Insight. 
Mayer et al. (1996) write that emotional intelligence is the ability to “hear” 
emotional information. In fact, the core of any intelligence is the ability to reason in the 
abstract and grasp abstract understanding (Mayer et al., 2001). In the context of 
emotional intelligence, abstract understanding refers to the ability to analyze emotions 
and identify their parts and how they combine (Mayer et al., 2001). The TMMS measures 
abstract understanding with the clarity domain that indexes one’s perception of his or her 
ability to decipher between feelings and make sense of them. In other words, at it’s core, 
emotional intelligence is the ability to understand how emotions “live.” Where do the 
different emotions come from, where will they go, what do they mean, and how do they 
affect the individual? I purpose that the ability to live within an emotion, to recognize and 
understand its complexity, is a skill helpful in achieving insight in therapy.
Emotional intelligence is like a magnet for emotional information that one can use 
to come to an emotional understanding of the self and oneself in relationships. Although 
definitions of insight vary, they have in common the notion of understanding oneself. 
Emotions provide us with information that enables us to reach an understanding, or 
insight into thoughts and feelings that shape behavior. They send us messages about past 
experiences, interpersonal dynamics, wishes, and defenses. Emotional intelligence 
involves the ability to perceive, or attend to, and understand these emotional messages, 
ultimately achieving insight into the depth of one’s experience. 
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Understanding our emotional reactions in therapy rests upon the ability to first 
detect or consciously perceive them. Perceiving one’s emotions is the first step to 
recognizing, accepting, and understanding them, which is an essential ingredient to the 
therapeutic process (Greenberg, 2002). Mayer, Dipaolo, and Salovey (1990) found 
evidence for a general ability, which differs between individuals, to detect and discern 
emotions in colors, abstract designs, and faces. The process of perceiving emotions is 
comparable to the input stage of intelligence (Mayer et al., 2001) in which the brain 
labels ambiguous stimuli, for example, fear or anxiety. The next task is to make sense of 
the emotions we perceive and label. Mayer and Geher (1996) found that people differ in 
their ability to “hear” the emotional implication, or grasp an emotional understanding, of 
stories presented by participants. When presented with accounts of real life situations, 
participants varied in their ability to identify the feelings of the characters, which feelings 
combined to form a new one, and how one feeling may flow into another. Arguably, 
knowing thyself is to know one’s emotional world. Emotions describe our experiences, 
within the self and in relation to other people. Thus, I purposed that EI would predict 
insight, as it deals with the ability to consciously perceive, express, and understand 
emotional knowledge; skills that may be helpful in achieving insight in psychotherapy.
Emotional Intelligence (EI), Insight, Transference, and Session Outcome. 
It was hypothesized that emotional intelligence would be positively related to 
session outcome. EI is the ability to process emotionally relevant information. It is the 
ability to access feelings, decipher their meaning, and use them to cope with the 
environment. Hypothetically, in an emotionally charged environment like counseling, the 
ability to use emotions to problem solve, will predict how valuable clients perceive the 
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process of counseling. Since perceived emotional intelligence deals with one’s ability to 
attend to, clearly experience, and regulate emotions, it predicts session outcome in an 
environment where emotional expression and regulation is valued. As elaborated above, 
the literature suggests that psychological mindedness predicts counseling outcome (e.g., 
Conte et al., 1990). Emotional intelligence is a similar construct to psychological 
mindedness as they both involve using emotions to understand oneself and one’s 
environment. Accordingly, it was reasonable to hypothesize that emotional intelligence 
also predicts outcome. 
One of the predictions of the present study was that client insight would be related 
to session outcome. Clients and therapists may value the development of insight since 
much of therapy rests upon the notion that with self-awareness clients are able to make 
more adaptive decisions. Thus, clients and therapists may perceive a session with 
relatively high insight to be valuable. Furthermore, the literature suggests that insight is 
related to symptom reduction (Kivlighan et al., 1990), and counseling outcome (e.g., 
O’Conner et al., 1994; Luborsky et al., 1988). However, Gelso et al. (1997) found a 
nonsignificant relationship between insight and counseling outcome. Through analyzing 
the relationship between insight and session outcome, the present experiment added 
additional information to the sparse yet conflicting literature on insight and outcome.
This study replicated previous literature that suggests that insight is a moderator 
of transference and outcome. An interaction effect of transference and insight on session 
outcome (Gelso et al., 1991) and counseling outcome (Gelso et al., 1997) has been 
supported in the literature. Specifically, high insight and high transference predict a 
successful outcome, while low insight and high transference predict a poor outcome. 
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Transference is often encouraged in counseling because once it is present the client and 
therapist have the opportunity to explore it. However, if in it’s presence, transference is 
not explored and understood, then the therapeutic relationship becomes a replication of 
other maladaptive relationships in the clients life. Transference, especially negative 
transference, can have a devastating affect on the working alliance if gone unrecognized 
(Gelso & Carter, 1985). Insight into one’s relationship patterns can lead to new ways of 
thinking and feeling in relationships. In other words, consciousness, or self-awareness 
into our feelings and behaviors, allows people to make a choice when responding to 
emotions and impulses. Gelso et al. (1991/1997) suggest that transference increasingly 
becomes under the control of client insight. 
Lastly, the experimenter hypothesized two-two way interaction effects of 
emotional intelligence, insight, and transference on session outcome. Similar to Gelso et 
al. (1991/1997), transference alone is not predicted to have a significant effect on 
outcome. However, when high emotional intelligence and high insight accompany 
transference, then a favorable session outcome was predicted. Emotional intelligence was 
hypothesized to predict insight. In other words, emotional intelligence was proposed to be 
a tool in achieving insight, specifically into the transference. Thus, emotional intelligence 
was predicted to change the level of insight that then moderate the relationship between 
transference and session outcome. On the other hand, when low emotional intelligence, 
and thus relatively low insight accompanies high transference, then it was predicted that 
the session outcome would be poor. In this scenario, the relatively low amount of 
emotional intelligence and insight, results in transference expressions that negatively 
impact the work as they are not brought into the client’s conscious understanding. It was 
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hypothesized that within both the high and low emotional intelligence groups, certain 
clients will show relatively high levels of transference in psychotherapy. However, 
consistent with the earlier hypothesis that transference and emotional intelligence are 
inversely related, it was hypothesized that when transference is high for both groups 
(high and low emotional intelligence), it is not as high for the high EI group as it is for 
the low EI group.
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Chapter 3
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Religion, philosophy, and psychology all value a state of consciousness where the 
self is alert to it’s inner most thoughts and feelings. In psychology, this process through 
which one becomes aware of the self is called insight. Gelso and Hayes (1998) define 
insight as the “extent to which the client displays accurate understanding of the material 
being explored. Understanding may be of the relationship, client’s functioning outside of 
counseling, or aspects of the client’s dynamics or behavior” (p. 212). In recent years, 
studies have illuminated the importance of insight by demonstrating a link between 
insight and counseling outcome. O’Conner, Edelstein, Berry, and Weiss (1994) found 
that the higher the average level of insight across therapy, the better the outcome. In 
another study, Luborsky, Crits-Cristoph, Mintz, and Auerbach (1988) found that some 
aspects of insight (self-understanding about the counselor and self-understanding about 
significant others) correlate with counseling outcome. Grenyer and Luborsky (1996) 
study a type of insight they call mastery, or the “acquisition of emotional self-control and 
intellectual self-understanding in the context of relationships” (p. 411). They found that 
changes in the level of mastery were related to observer, counselor, and client ratings of 
outcome. Lastly, Kivlighan, Multon, and Patton (2000) found that across 20 counseling 
sessions insight had a linear increase as symptoms showed a linear decrease. 
Furthermore, they used time-series analysis to show that increases in insight led 
reductions in symptoms.
 Experience, theory, and research all suggest that insight is a crucial ingredient to 
a successful therapeutic outcome. Thus, it is essential that we identify variables that 
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predict or hinder client insight. For example, a client’s level of insight may be influenced 
by certain individual differences. The present study looked at a somewhat new and 
controversial individual difference variable called emotional intelligence. I hypothesized 
that emotional intelligence would be a useful tool in achieving insight. Emotional 
intelligence involves “how one reasons about emotions and also about how emotions help 
reasoning” (Mayer, 2003; cited in Benson, 2003). More specifically, it is the ability to 
input and process emotion-relevant information to guide adaptive thought and behavior 
(Mayer, Caruso, Salovey, & Sitarenios, 2003). Theoretically, to gain insight into one’s 
emotions one must naturally possess or learn these abilities. Emotional intelligence has 
significant relevance to what Hohage and Kubler (1988) call emotional insight. 
Emotional insight requires more then reasoning from thought, it requires reasoning from 
emotions, and a synthesis between understanding arising from thought and understanding 
arising from emotions. Through identifying individual abilities that predict insight, 
clinicians are better equipped to help clients who are struggling to reach a state of 
understanding. 
Insight into relationships is critical for the survival of many species, including 
human beings. Collaborating with other animals has been an evolutionary advantage, 
giving rise to packs, tribes, friends, and even families. Evolution has endowed human 
beings with emotional responses that carry information about the environment and the 
relationships in them (Darwin, 1872/1965). For example, across many species mothers 
develop a unique type of love for their children. Evolutionarily speaking, a mother’s love 
serves to keep the mother near the child, caring for it in such a delicate and persistent way 
to ensure the continuation of the species (see Sagan, 1976). Mayer, Caruso, and Salovey 
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(2000) write that emotions arise in response to a person’s changing relationships. The 
content of a relationship gives rise to different emotions that in return convey meaning 
about the content or dynamics of the relationship (Shwartz & Clore, 1983). Emotional 
intelligence involves accurately reading and effectively utilizing emotional information 
concerning relationships. It was hypothesized that when emotions are not accurately 
“heard” and used to make adaptive decisions, then relationships suffer, giving rise to such 
phenomena as transference. 
A plethora of frameworks of emotional intelligence has arisen in the literature. 
These frameworks generally fall under either an information-processing or mixed model 
of emotional intelligence. The information-processing model views emotions as a source 
of information about the world, the self, and others that the mind can process and utilize 
to construct adaptive emotion itself, thought, and behavior. Mayer, Salovey, and 
colleagues have developed two measures that are guided by the information-processing 
model of emotional intelligence (See Mayer et al., 2003 & Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, 
Turvey, & Palfai, 1995). The first measure (MSECIT; Mayer et al., 2003) is an ability-
based measure of emotional intelligence that operationalizes emotional intelligence as the 
ability to perceive, generate thought from, understand, and manage emotion. The second 
measure (TMMS; Salovey et al., 1995) of emotional intelligence is a self-report measure 
of perceived emotional intelligence, with the following subscales: attention to emotions, 
clarity of emotional experience, and regulation of emotion. The three subscales coincide 
with the input (attention), process (clarity), and output (regulation) stages of the 
information-processing model of intelligence. The TMMS developed from a line of 
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research on the meta-mood experience, or the process of consciously attending to, 
understanding, and regulating one’s conscious moods (Mayer & Gaschke, 1988). 
While perceived emotional intelligence cannot yield an actual emotional IQ, it can 
provide important insight into how one perceives emotional competencies. One’s 
perception, or self-efficacy, pertaining to certain emotional competencies may guide 
behavior more than one’s actual level of ability (Bandura, 1977). In the study at hand, 
counselors rated their perception of the client’s emotional intelligence, using the TMMS. 
Usually self-report ratings are influenced by self-concept. However, in this case, the 
observer, i.e., the counselor, influenced the ratings of emotional intelligence. The 
counselor’s perception of his or her client’s emotional intelligence is an interesting 
variable for the counselor witnesses the client’s emotional skills through a privileged 
window. The counselor may see the client’s motivation and effort; not just his or her 
natural ability, when solving emotionally charged tasks. This study investigated 
psychotherapy clients’ emotional intelligence, through the eyes of the counselor, in 
relation to insight, transference, and session outcome. 
The literature suggests that a similar construct to emotional intelligence, called 
psychological mindedness (PM), is a predictor of client insight and counseling outcome. 
Similar to emotional intelligence, various authors have operationalized psychological 
mindedness in different and sometimes conflicting ways (e.g., Appelbaum, 1973; Hall, 
1992; McCallum & Piper, 1997). For example, Shill and Lumley (2002) operationalize 
PM as two main factors: belief in the benefits of discussing one’s problems, and access to 
feelings. According to Shill and Lumley (2002), lower order factors of PM include: 
willingness to discuss problems with others, interest in meaning and motivation of own 
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and others’ behavior, and openness to change. Hall (1992) notes that the plethora of 
definitions of PM found in the literature addresses two separate personality domains: 
interest/ability as well as intellect/affect. She operationalizes PM according to both of 
these dimensions. 
Shill and Lumley’s (2002) conceptualization of PM is similar to the subscales of 
emotional intelligence: attending to, clarity of, and regulation of emotions (TMMS; 
Salovey et al., 1995). For example, attending to emotions is similar to accessing them, 
clarifying emotions is comparable to one’s interest in deciphering the meaning behind 
behaviors,  and discussing one’ feelings is a way of regulating them. In addition, the 
literature suggests that emotional intelligence correlates with certain aspects of Shill and 
Lumley’s (2002) definition of PM. For example, emotional intelligence has been 
correlated with an openness to change (Caruso, Mayer, & Salovey, 2002) and with 
sharing feelings (Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 2000).
The very definition of PM delineates the ability or desire to understand, or 
achieve insight, into one’s feelings and behaviors in addition to those of others. In fact, 
Grant (2001) suggests that measuring an individual’s metacognitive processes of self-
reflection and insight should be used to operationalize PM. Implicitly stated in studies 
concerning PM as a predictor of counseling outcome, is the belief that psychologically 
minded people will achieve more insight throughout therapy. Thus, they will obtain a 
better counseling outcome then less psychologically minded individuals given the same 
amount of time in counseling. Clinicians and researchers have considered psychological 
mindedness to be a helpful client characteristic in insight-oriented therapy (e.g., Taylor, 
1995), as well as in supportive forms of therapy (Piper, Joyce, Mcallum, & Azim, 1998). 
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Also, PM has been linked to the treatment outcome of day patients (McCallum & Piper, 
1997), the outcome of short-term individual psychotherapy (Piper et al., 1998), number of 
therapy sessions (Conte, Plutchik, Jung, Picard, Karasu, & Lotterman, 1990), subjective 
well being (Tradeau & Reich, 1995), and the outcome of insight-oriented group therapy 
(Abramowitz & Abramowitz, 1974).  
Psychological mindedness and emotional intelligence both speak to the notion 
that insight into one’s emotions is adaptive and important to the counseling process. The 
literature has theoretically linked PM to insight and empirically to treatment outcome. 
Thus, it was reasonable to hypothesize that emotional intelligence is also a predictor of 
client insight and session outcome. One reason that insight is relevant to counseling 
outcome is because it enables clients to understand and manage maladaptive emotional 
reactions in relationships.
Since Freud’s original papers on transference (1912/1958, 1905/1958), 
psychodynamic therapists have viewed transference behaviors as a set of symptoms that 
can be resolved with the advent of insight. Since Freud, many theoreticians have grappled 
with the relationship between insight and transference. Graff and Luborsky (1977) found 
that in long-term therapy transference and insight both increase linearly. They explained 
this unexpected result by suggesting that as therapy progresses transference increasingly 
becomes under the control of insight. Later, Gelso and Carter (1985, 1994) discussed 
their conception of the relationship between insight and transference. Similar to Graff and 
Luborsky (1977), they hypothesized that transference has a positive effect on the 
counseling process when it is continually brought under the control of client insight. 
Without insight, transference, especially negative transference, can have a devastating 
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effect on the working alliance (Gelso & Carter, 1985). The research suggests that there is 
an interaction effect between transference and insight that predicts session outcome 
(Gelso, Hill, & Kivlighan, 1991), and short-term treatment outcome (Gelso, Kivlighan, 
Wine, Jones, & Friedman, 1997). These studies suggest that it is not solely the level of 
transference that predicts outcome, but the level of accompanying insight. The 
relationship between insight and outcome, and between insight and transference, call for 
research that investigates what abilities are necessary to obtain insight and manage 
transference. Consequently, this study examined the relationship between emotional 
intelligence and insight, and emotional intelligence and transference. 
In the Gelso et al. (1997) paper on insight and transference in time-limited 
therapy, the authors remark on the paucity of research on transference. While there has 
been an enormous amount of theoretical literature on the centrality of transference to the 
therapeutic process, until recently actual empirical research to prove this claim has been 
almost non existent. In the past nine years, the development of the Core Conflictual 
Relationship Theme (Luborsky, Popp, Luborsky, & Mark, 1994) has spurred much 
research on the content of transference. However, with some exception (e.g., Gelso et al., 
1997; Graff & Luborsky, 1977), the amount of transference still remains largely 
untouched. The present study attempted to begin to fill in this gap of knowledge by 
investigating how the amount of transference is related to certain client characteristics. 
Transference occurs within a context of numerous other variables, as demonstrated by the 
Gelso et al. (1997) study. It does not “think and behave” in the same manner for every 
individual. Thus, it is essential that research does not confine transference to a bubble, 
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and that instead we study transference in the context of such factors as emotional 
intelligence and insight.
In addition to establishing whether transference is important to the counseling 
relationship and process, theory and research have debated over what transference 
actually is. According to the classical definition proposed by Freud, transference is the 
reexperiencing of oedipal issues in the therapeutic relationship. However, a modern 
constructivist position emphasizes intersubjective thought by defining transference as an 
unconscious organizing process that involves both the therapist and the client (Stolorow, 
1991). Gelso and Hayes (1998) incorporate the classical and modern definition of 
transference as “the client’s experience of the therapist that is shaped by the client’s own 
psychological structures and past and involves displacement, onto the therapist of 
feelings, attitudes and behaviors belonging rightfully in earlier significant relationships” 
(p.51). It is apparent that there is not a single definition of transference in the literature, 
but that each school of thought looks at transference from a different angle.  The present 
study offers an additional angle through which one may conceptualize transference. 
Gelso and Hayes’ (1998) definition of transference emphasizes three aspects: 
repetition, displacement, and schema. In addition to these three aspects, I view 
transference as an ‘emotional problem’ that requires emotional problem solving abilities. 
Transference is an emotional response to traumatic childhood relationships. For example, 
when children appropriately experience fear, love, abandonment, or anger in significant 
relationships, they may continue to experience these feelings as adults even when they 
are inappropriate responses within the context of relationships. Transference is a problem 
in the sense that it involves inappropriate affect that causes conflict in a client’s life. The 
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‘solution’ involves deciphering which emotions are responses to past relationships, and 
which emotions are appropriate given the context of a particular relationship. The content 
and context of a relationship calls for certain emotional responses. For example, a 
menacing face and body posture call for fear or anger. Mayer and Salovey (1995) suggest 
that an ‘emotionally intelligent model,’ or schema concerning assumptions about 
emotions, includes the belief that good emotional regulation and construction requires 
flexibility in processing, i.e., emotions are context specific. However, with the 
transference phenomena, emotional responses are generalized to all relationships, failing 
to take into account unique interpersonal signals that call for various emotional 
responses. To varying degrees, individuals possess the ability to construct and express 
appropriate emotion given a certain context, including interpersonal contexts.
As emphasized in numerous definitions, transference involves unconscious 
conflict and displacement from early relationships onto present ones. However, if our 
conception of transference were to stop here, we would fail to capture the human 
experience of transference, an experience that lies in the affective realm of the individual. 
The emotions that underlie transference carry meaningful information about past trauma 
and relationships. It is purposed that the ability to decipher the messages that emotions 
carry, and to construct appropriate emotions based on the context, is a problem solving 
skill that can be used to work through problematic emotional responses such as 
transference.
Since the publication of Daniel Goleman’s book (1995) on emotional intelligence, 
the popular buzz surrounding the concept has irked many critiques and encouraged many 
followers. In his book, Emotional Intelligence: Why It Can Matter More Than IQ (1995), 
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Goleman defines emotional intelligence as everything from motivation to empathy and 
hope (p.34). He argues that these qualities predict success at home, school, and in the 
workplace. The importance that Goleman gives to emotional intelligence moves at a 
faster pace than the literature. To date, most of the literature on emotional intelligence has 
focused on constructing a measure and developing a theory. Research is needed to assess 
the real-life application of emotional intelligence. The present study began to fill in this 
gap in the literature, assessing whether emotional intelligence is an important variable to 
the counseling relationship, process, and session outcome. 
The validity of emotional intelligence may be further assessed if research tests 
whether it predicts theoretically related variables, such as insight. Insight has long been 
“considered to be the cornerstone of psychoanalytic therapy and structural change” 
(Crits-Cristoph, Barber, Miller, & Bebe, 1993, p.408). Theoretically, insight results in a 
mature and integrated ego that can manage affect and adaptively cope in one’s 
environment (Crits-Cristoph et al., 1993). Thus, it is important to the success of therapy 
that we find empirical evidence for variables that predict client insight, such as emotional 
intelligence. Also, as a field, counseling psychology focuses on identifying and 
actualizing upon client strengths. However, research on the predictors of insight have 
focused on therapist abilities and behaviors in relation to insight, looking at the 
relationship between the amount and content of therapist interpretations and client insight 
(e.g., Marziali, 1984). On the contrary, the present study examined an individual’s ability 
to achieve insight. Also, if transference is negatively correlated with emotional 
intelligence then perhaps this set of abilities can one day be taught and focused upon in 
therapy to help work through the transference. The present study sought to establish the 
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practicality of emotional intelligence by looking at its relationship to insight, 
transference, and session outcome.
Hypotheses:
1) Emotional Intelligence is positively related to insight
2) Emotional Intelligence is negatively related to transference
3) Emotional Intelligence is positively related to session outcome
4) Insight is positively related to session outcome
5) Insight is a partial mediator of emotional intelligence and session outcome
6) There will be an interaction effect of transference and insight on session outcome
7a) There will be an interaction effect of transference and insight on session outcome, 
such that when emotional intelligence is relatively high, high transference and high 
insight will predict the most favorable session outcome. 
7b) There will be an interaction effect of transference and insight on session outcome, 
such that when emotional intelligence is relatively low, low insight and high transference 
will predict the least favorable session outcome. 
Exploratory question 1: 
Does negative versus positive transference have a significantly different effect on the 
hypotheses listed above?
Exploratory question 2:






The design of this study was a descriptive field study. Heppner, Kivlighan, and 
Wampold (1999) characterize these studies as “ investigations that do not exercise 
experimental control (randomization, manipulation of variables) and are conducted in a 
real life setting” (p.48). Due to the nature of the design, the present study was high in 
external validity since participants were directly recruited from the population of interest. 
On the other hand, the present study had lower internal validity due to the lack of 
manipulation of the variables. Thus, it is impossible to establish a cause and effect 
relationship between emotional intelligence, insight, transference, and session outcome.
The purpose of this study was to assess the relationship between client emotional 
intelligence, insight, transference, and session impact. The basic design is quantitative 
and descriptive. Client emotional intelligence was predicted to be related to the level of 
insight, transference, and session impact. It was predicted that emotional intelligence 
would be positively related to insight and negatively related to the level of transference. 
Lastly, an interaction effect for transference, insight, and emotional intelligence on 
session outcome was predicted. 
Emotional intelligence was assessed with the Trait Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS; 
Salovey et al., 1995). This measure is a self-report measure and was completed by the 
counselor based on his or her experience of the client. The therapist rated client 
transference by completing the Missouri Identifying Transference Scale (MITS; Multon, 
Patton, & Kivlighan, 1996), and the Transference Session Check Sheet (TSCS; Graff & 
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Luborsky, 1977). Counselors assessed insight by using a modified version of the 
Relationship Questionnaire (Gelso, Hill, & Kivlighan, 1991) that asks counselors to rate 
overall, emotional, and intellectual insight. Lastly, in the present study, the counselor 
completed the Session Evaluation Scale (SES; Hill & Kellems, 2002) to measure session 
outcome.
Participants
We obtained data from 30 participating therapists (40 % return rate). One 
therapist completed the measures for one client, 2 therapists completed them for 2 clients, 
and all other therapists completed the measures for 3 clients. In total, the sample 
consisted of 86 counselor session ratings (n=86). Four of the counselors were male, and 
26 were female. Twenty- nine of the therapists were white, and 1 was African- American. 
Among the counselors participating in this study, there were 3 M. A.s, 11 Ph. D.s, 1 
MSS, 1 MSSW, 1 Psy D, 1 Ed. D., 5 B. A.s, 1 LPC, 1 Me. D., 4 MSWs, and 1 Ed. M.  
Thirteen of the counselors identified their therapeutic techniques as mostly 
psychoanalytic/psychodynamic, 6 as humanistic, 3 as cognitive-behavioral, 2 as 
psychodynamic and cognitive-behavioral, 2 as humanistic and cognitive-behavioral, 2 as 
psychodynamic and humanistic, 1 as humanistic/ jungian, and 1 as humanistic/ somatic. 
Counselor experience ranged from 1.5 years to 30 years (M= 13 years, SD= 9.0). 
The average counselor age was 45 years. Nineteen of the counselors saw patients in a 
private practice, 7 in a college counseling center, 1 in a corporate health care setting, 1 in 
a nonprofit agency, 1 at a psychoanalytic counseling center, and 1 in a correctional 
institution. 
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Six of the counselors were in training, and 3 were in post-doctoral training. Most 
supervisors were psychodynamic; however, two of the trainees had humanistic 
supervisors. There was a large variation in time after the target counseling session that 
counselors completed the questionnaires (M=10 hrs, SD= 14hrs). Counselors completed 
the questionnaires for this study after sessions with primarily female clients (69% female, 
30% male). Ninety- four percent of these clients were Caucasian while only 5 % were 
African- American.  At the time of the study, 78 % of these clients were in long-term 
treatment (defined as more than 20 sessions) with the counselor completing the 
questionnaires and 21 % were in short-term treatment, defined as 12 sessions or less. The 
mean for the session number after which counselors completed the questionnaires 
indicate that this sample primarily represents counselors’ perceptions of long-term 
psychotherapy patients (M = 70, SD= 105). The range of session number was from a 
minimum of 2 to a maximum of 500.
Measures
 Therapy Session Check Sheet- Transference Items (TSCS; Graff  & Luborsky, 
1977). The TSCS is a 3-item questionnaire designed to measure client transference from 
the therapists vantagepoint. Each item is measured on a 5-point scale ranging from none 
or slight (1) to very much (5). A copy of the TSCS is included in Appendix B. The TSCS 
consists of three dimensions of transference: transference amount, negative transference, 
and positive transference. The reliability of the transference items has been demonstrated 
in several ways. For example, Graff and Luborsky (1997, p.473) found “adequate 
interjudge agreement” for the transference items as a total score. The internal 
consistency, as measured by Cronbach’s alpha, for these items rated after the first session 
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was .84; for ratings summed after the first quarter of therapy, Cronbach’s alpha was .81 
(Graff et al., 1977).  In addition, Gelso et al. (1997) used the TSCS to measure 
transference, although they incorporated it into a larger Relationship Questionnaire. They 
calculated coefficients that are equivalent to retest reliability since they measured 
transference across sessions. The resulting stability estimates were .66 for positive 
transference, .86 for negative transference, and .69 for transference amount. Gelso et al. 
(1997) did not expect a very high reliability coefficient given that transference tends to 
vary over time. 
 Graff and Luborsky (1977) reported some evidence that the TSCS has adequate 
validity. Specifically, rated variables followed theoretically predicted paths over the 
course of long term psychoanalysis. Gelso et al. (1991) found that ratings of positive and 
negative transference on the TSCS were related in theoretically meaningful ways to the 
use of counselor intentions. Kivlighan (1995) reported a high correlation (r= .67) between 
ratings of the three combined transference items by 21 counselors and their supervisors. 
Lastly, Patton, Kivlighan, and Multon (1995) found that counselor ratings of client 
positive and negative transference were related to client pre-therapy ratings of his or her 
schema of the mother, father, or both.
The Missouri Identifying Transference Scale (MITS; Multon, Patton, & Kivlighan, 
1996).  The MITS is a 37-item questionnaire designed to assess client transference from 
the therapist’s vantagepoint. Similarly, past research has primarily looked at transference 
from the therapist’s vantagepoint (e.g., Gelso, Hill, & Kivlighan, 1991; Gelso, Kivlighan, 
Wine, Jones, & Friedman, 1997; Graff & Luborsky, 1977). Each item on the MITS is 
rated on a 5-point scale, ranging from not evident (1) to very evident (5). A copy of the 
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MITS is included in Appendix C. The MITS consists of multiple adjectives designed to 
capture Greenson’s (1967) five characteristics of client transference reactions: 
inappropriateness, intensity or lack of emotion, hidden ambivalence, capriciousness, and 
tenacity. A factor analysis of the MITS suggests two correlated factors that account for 
52% of the item variance. Multon, Kivlighan, and Patton (1996) labeled these factors 
Negative (NTR) and Positive (PTR) Transference Reactions. 
Reliability estimates of internal consistency (Coefficient alpha) for the NTR and 
the PTR scales were good, .96 and .88, respectively. In addition, Multon et al. (1996) 
provide evidence for good validity of the MITS. The PTR items were positively 
correlated with single item ratings of amount of transference and amount of positive 
transference. The NTR was positively correlated with single item ratings of amount of 
negative transference and negatively correlated with single item ratings of amount of 
positive transference. To further asses the validity of the MITS, Multon, Patton, and 
Kivlighan (1996) examined the relationship between NTR and PTR scores and the 
clients’ perceptions of their parents on the Interpersonal Schema Questionnaire (ISQ; 
Safran & Hill, 1989).  The ISQ scales describe the amount of Control, Sociability, 
Affiliation, and Trust that each client experienced from each of his or her caregivers. 
When clients saw their mothers as controlling, untrustworthy, less social, and less 
affiliate, the therapist experienced more negative transference reactions during the middle 
sessions of treatment. The MITS has greater reliability and validity than previous single 
items of transference. In addition, it is a quick and easy way for therapists to assess client 
transference.
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Relationship Rating Scale- Insight Scale (RRS; Gelso, Hill, & Kivlighan, 1991). 
Gelso et al. (1991) developed the RRS to measure counselor-perceived transference, 
insight and working alliance. For the purposes of this study, counselors will complete the 
three insight items (overall, intellectual, and emotional) of the RRS. Each construct is 
rated on a 5-point Likert Scale in terms of amount exhibited during the session (from 
1=none or slight to 5=very much). Definitions of the constructs to be rated will be 
provided on the questionnaire. A copy of the RRS- Insight Scale is included in 
AppendixD.
Gelso et al. (1997) examined the relationship of insight and transference in 
psychotherapy over 12 sessions. They determined the stability of the two insight items 
(intellectual, emotional) by calculating an alpha coefficient for the insight items in their 
sample on the basis of the first four questionnaires filled out by each counselor for each 
client. On the basis of the first four questionnaires completed by the counselor, alpha 
coefficients for the insight items were .72 for intellectual insight and .77 for emotional 
insight. The validity of the insight ratings has been assessed in a number of ways. Gelso 
et al. (1991) and Gelso et al.’s (1997) results suggest that, as hypothesized, transference 
and insight ratings interacted to predict session and counseling outcome. Also, Kivlighan 
(1995) found support for the construct validity of the two insight items in the tendency of 
counselors and supervisors to agree on their ratings of client’s intellectual (r=.71) and 
emotional (r=.75) insight. In sum, these results suggest that the insight measure is a valid 
indicator of theoretically related variables. 
Trait Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS; Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai, 
1995). Mayer and Salovey (1993) have organized a set of emotion-related competencies 
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into a framework of emotional intelligence. Salovey et al. (1995) describe the TMMS as 
“a measure of individual differences in the ability to reflect upon and mange one’s 
emotions” (p.127). Accordingly, the TMMS indexes the degree of attention that 
individuals devote to their feelings, the clarity of their experience of these feelings, and 
their beliefs about terminating negative mood states or prolonging positive ones. The 
authors do not claim that the TMMS is a measure of emotional IQ. Instead, they purpose 
the measure as an index of perceived emotional intelligence, or a way to assess “core 
individual differences that may characterize emotionally intelligence individuals capable 
of disclosing their feelings to themselves and other people” (p.127).
Salovey et al. (1995) started their investigation of the trait-meta mood construct 
by asking nearly 200 individuals to respond to 48 items drawn from a larger item set 
employed by Mayer, Mamberg, and Volanth (1988). The items were divided into five 
domains: clarity of emotional perception, strategies of emotional regulation, integration 
of feelings, attention to emotions, and attitudes about emotions. Subjects responded to 
randomly ordered items along a 5-point scale anchored by 1=strongly disagree and 5= 
strongly agree. The researchers hypothesized that the factor structure would map into 
three primary domains of reflective mood experience described by Mayer and Gaschke 
(1988): monitoring moods, discriminating among moods, and regulating them. The factor 
analysis confirmed their hypothesis and three domains were created: attention to feelings, 
clarity of feelings, and mood repair. 
The 30-item version of the scale is recommended in which all items showed a 
loading of .40 or higher on the appropriate domain. The attention scale includes 13 items, 
such as, “I pay a lot of attention to how I feel.” It has an alpha of .86 and does not 
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correlate with the other subscales.  The clarity subscale consists of 11 items, such as, “ I 
am usually very clear about my feelings.” It has an alpha of .88 and shows a significant 
correlation (r=.39) with the repair subscale. Lastly, the repair subscale contains 6 items, 
such as, “When I become upset I remind myself of all the pleasures in life.” It has an 
alpha of .82 and a significant correlation with the clarity subscale. 
Using a separate sample of 152 students, Salovey et al. (1995) performed a 
confirmatory factor analysis. The chi-square significance test of global fit suggests that 
the three-factor model fits the data generated by the second sample (X2 (48)=49.56, ns). 
The goodness-of-fit index (GFI) provided was .94, indicating that the three-factor 
structure of the TMMS accounted for a large portion of the total covariance. The root 
mean square residual was .05, also suggesting that the actual and predicted models are 
significantly similar. 
Salovey et al. (1995) provided evidence for convergent and discriminant validity 
of the TMMS. The subscales of the TMMS should relate to other measures of mood and 
mood management. The Ambivalence over Emotional Expressiveness Questionnaire 
(AEQ; King & Emmons, 1990) taps into dissatisfaction with one’s emotional expression. 
The AEQ significantly correlated with the clarity domain of the TMMS, r= -.25, p< .05. 
The Expectancies for Negative Mood Regulation (NMR; Catanzaro & Mearns, 1990) 
concerns the belief that one can change negative moods. It significantly correlates with 
the repair domain of the TMMS, r = .53, p< .01. Finally, the self-consciousness scale 
measures (SCS; Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975) the tendency to attend to aspects of 
ongoing consciousness including mood. The attention domain significantly correlates 
with both private self-consciousness (r=.42) and public self-consciousness (r=.36). 
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Coffey, Berenbaum, and Kerns explored the relationship between Alexithymia, 
using the Tas-20 (Bagby & Parker, 1996), and the three domains of the TMMS. The Tas-
20 measures difficulty in identifying and describing feelings, and externally oriented 
thinking. Theoretically, the Tas-20 should negatively correlate with any measure of 
emotional intelligence. As predicted, the three subscales of the Tas-20 negatively 
correlated with the three domains of the TMMS, ranging from r= -.17 to r=.46. Mood 
awareness was also assessed with the MAS (Swinkels & Giuliano, 1995), which 
measures mood monitoring and mood labeling. As predicted, the two MAS subscales 
significantly correlated with subscales of the TMMS, ranging from r= .16 to .57. Finally, 
with a self-report measure of emotional intelligence, we would predict a moderate 
correlation with personality variables. Accordingly, personality as assessed by the NEO-
FFI (Costa & McCrae, 1989), showed theoretically predicted correlations with unclarity 
of emotions and attention to emotions. Specifically, neuroticism was moderately 
correlated with unclarity of emotion, r=.34, p<.01. Extraversion was moderately 
correlated with attention to emotion, r=.35, p<.01, and openness to experience was 
correlated with attention to emotion, r=.51, p<.01. In sum, the three-factor model of the 
TMMS appears to be a valid predictor of theoretically related variables. 
The present experiment asked counselors to complete the attention to and clarity 
of emotions subscales. The regulation of emotion subscale was not included for several 
reasons. First, due to time limitations it was important to reduce the amount of items that 
counselors were asked to complete. More importantly, the regulating emotion domain 
seems to be tapping into optimism, as it endorses items such as “Although I am 
sometimes sad, I have a mostly optimistic outlook.” The repair domain significantly 
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correlates with optimism, r=.53, p<. 01 (Salovey et al., 1995). Adaptively managing 
emotions may entail “holding” not eradicating negative mood states. Also, while the 
attention and clarity subscales are not significantly correlated with each other, suggesting 
independence, the regulating emotion domain is significantly correlated with the clarity 
of emotion subscale. Finally, Coffey et al. (2003) found that a two-factor structure was 
more appropriate for the TMMS than the three-factor structure employed by Salovey et 
al. (1995), although the three-factor model has been supported by other independent 
studies (e.g., Ghorbani, Watson, Davison, & Mack, 2002). Also, for the purposes of this 
investigation, the wording of the items on the TMMS were altered from “I. . .” to “my 
client . ..” since the TMMS will be used as an observer measure instead of a self-report 
measure. A copy of the TMMS (attention, clarity) is included in Appendix E. 
Session Evaluation Scale (SES; Hill & Kellems; 2002).  The SES is a 4-item self-
report questionnaire designed to measure client perceptions of session quality. The SES 
uses the stem, “I . . .” followed by 4 items. The SES uses a 5-point scale, ranging from 
strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). A copy of the SES is included in Appendix F. 
To test the factor structure of the measure Hill and Kellems (2002) divided their sample 
on the basis of semester (fall, spring) so that they could do an exploratory and then a 
confirmatory factor analysis. The exploratory principal-axis factor analysis of the four 
items (with Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Index of .82) revealed one factor with all items loading 
greater than .50, accounting for 77 % of the variance. The confirmatory factor analysis, 
using data from a different subsample than the one used in the exploratory factor 
analysis, suggested that the one-factor model was a good fit for the data (GFI = .97, 
RMSEA = .17, CFI = .97). Hill and Kellems (2002) found that the internal consistency 
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(Cronbach’s alpha) for the total sample (n = 322) was excellent, .91. The SES correlated 
.51 ( p < .001) with the client-rated SEQ-Depth scale for a subsample of 165 volunteer 
clients, providing some evidence for concurrent validity.
Procedure
Selection of counselors. The researcher obtained permission to ask counseling 
psychology practicum students at a large northeastern university to participate in the 
study. In addition, the researcher contacted therapists in private practice obtained through 
an alumni list, word of mouth, and contemporary pscyhoanalytic institutes. These 
therapists were sent packet(s) of measures via mail. In some cases, a particular therapist 
would act as a contact person, distributing packets of measures to colleagues. All 
counselors must have completed at least one counseling practicum course, including 
prepracticum, to increase the likelihood that they have the knowledge and experience to 
detect transference. 
Treatment Procedures. Counselors and clients continued to meet at their regular 
location and during their regularly scheduled appointment time. Sessions lasted 
approximately 50 minutes. The researcher put no restrictions on the content of the 
sessions. 
       Participants completed the following tasks in carrying out the data collection for the 
present experiment. First, either by mail or in person, the researcher delivered the 
questionnaires to potential participants. Counselors were instructed to complete the 
questionnaires after their next session with a client in the middle of treatment. The 
questionnaires included the Trait-Meta Mood Scale, Missouri Identifying Transference 
Scale, Therapist Session Check Sheet, Relationship Questionnaire (Insight Scale), and the 
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Session Evaluation Scale, along with a demographic and informed consent form. The 
items of the TMMS were altered to read “my client . . .,” instead of “I . . .”  A copy of the 
informed consent form is included in Appendix G. The participants were asked to repeat 
this for three clients, more specifically for the next three clients to walk into the room 
who are in the middle of treatment. The instructions asked counselors to complete the 
questionnaires immediately after the appropriate session or within the next 24 hours. 
Participants mailed back the questionnaires to the researcher in the provided envelope. 
They will be sent a debriefing form that explains the purpose of the study. A copy of the 
instructions that were provided to participants is included in Appendix H.
Analyses
Hypothesis 1: 
Emotional intelligence is positively related to insight.
A Pearson Correlation statistic will be computed for emotional intelligence and insight.
Hypothesis 2:
Emotional intelligence is negatively related to transference
A Pearson Correlation statistic will be computed for emotional intelligence and 
transference. 
Hypothesis 3: 
Emotional intelligence is positively related to session outcome.




Insight is positively related to session outcome.
A Pearson Correlation statistic will be computed for insight and session outcome.
Hypothesis 5:
Insight is a partial mediator of emotional intelligence and session outcome.
The researcher will use a Multiple Regression statistic to test this partial mediation 
model. The researcher will regress emotional intelligence on session outcome, insight on 
session outcome, and emotional intelligence and insight on session outcome. 
Hypothesis 6: 
There will be an interaction effect of transference and insight on session outcome.
The researcher will use a Multiple Regression statistic to regress insight and transference 
on session outcome.
Hypothesis 7a: 
There will be an interaction effect of transference and insight on session outcome, 
such that when emotional intelligence is relatively high, high transference and high 
insight will predict the most favorable session outcome. 
The researcher will use a Multiple Regression statistic to regress transference and insight 
on session outcome for clients with relatively high ratings of emotional intelligence.
Hypothesis 7b:
There will be an interaction effect of transference and insight on session outcome, 
such that when emotional intelligence is relatively low, low insight and high 
transference will predict the least favorable session outcome.
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The researcher will use a Multiple Regression statistic to regress transference and insight 
on session outcome for clients with relatively low ratings of emotional intelligence.
Exploratory Question 1:
Do the results of the hypotheses above significantly differ when negative versus positive 
transference is entered into the equation?
Exploratory Question 2:
Do the results of the hypotheses above significantly differ when emotional versus 





 Descriptive Statistics. The mean, standard deviations, and correlations are 
presented in table 1. The means for the 3 item transference measure are (M= 2.95 
transference amount, 2.85 positive transference, and 1.74 negative transference). The 
mean scores for amount, negative, and positive transference were within a standard 
deviation of the results obtained by counselors in previous research (Gelso et al., 1997). 
The means for transference amount and positive transference approach the midpoint of 
the range (1-5), suggesting that, on average, counselor’s perceived a moderate amount of 
transference. On average, counselors perceived relatively less negative transference than 
positive transference or transference amount, as consistent with earlier studies (e.g., 
Gelso et al., 1997). On the other hand, the means for the MITS were higher for negative 
transference than for positive transference (M= 1.98, 1.73 respectively).
The negative transference subscale of the MITS correlated with the negative 
transference and transference amount (.45, p <. 05, and .30 respectively, p < .01) items 
from the 3-item measure of transference. The positive subscale of the MITS correlated 
with the transference amount and positive transference (.28, p < .05, and .40 respectively, 
p <. 01) items from the 3-item transference measure. The correlations between these two 
transference measures suggest that they are related but still unique. 
The means for the 3-item insight measure (M= 2.98 insight amount, 3.12 
intellectual insight, and 2.44 emotional insight) are within a standard deviation of 3, the 
91
midpoint of the range (1-5), suggesting that this sample on average reported a moderate 
amount of client insight. However, on average, this sample reported more intellectual 
insight than emotional insight, as consistent with Gelso et al. (1997). 
Insight amount significantly correlates with intellectual insight and emotional 
insight (.72, .68 respectively, p < .01). Intellectual and emotional insight are moderately 
correlated (r= .35, p < .01), suggesting that the two constructs are unique yet related to 
each other. 
The perceived emotional intelligence measure has two subscales: attention and 
clarity. The mean for attention (M= 3.70) is above the midpoint of the range (ranging 
from 1-5) and the mean for clarity (M= 3.10) is only slightly above the midpoint. This 
finding suggests that counselors perceived more client attention skills than clarity skills. 
Attention and clarity were significantly correlated (r= .57, p <. 01), as theoretically 
predicted. 
The mean for outcome (M= 4.12, SD= .83) is a standard deviation above 3, the 
midpoint. Further analyses may have been impacted by little variability in counselor rated 
outcome. In fact, 56 % of the counseling sessions were rated between 4 and 5 on the 
session outcome measure that ranges from 1-5. 
Table 1
   Means and Standard Deviations for and Correlations Among 
  Emotional Intelligence (Attention/ Clarity), Insight, Transference, and Outcome
Scale  M  SD    1            2   3    4   5     6    7    8     9             10         11
1. 
Attention
3.70 .77 --- .57** .35** .37**.15 .21 -
.30**
.38** -.15       .03        .23*             
.





2.98 1.03 .35** .38** --- .68**.72**.18 -
.31**























1.741.02 -.30**-.32**-.31**-.26* -.10 .43*
*





2.851.17 .38** .28** .39** .29**.36**.59*
*








1.98.74 -.15 -.10 -.15 -.01 -.03 .30*
*





1.73.63 .03 .01 .01 .09 .04 .28*
*




4.12.83 .23* .19 .25* .14 .14 .12 -.12 .14 -.17            .11         ---
                            Note. n= 86. MITS= Missouri Identifying Transference Scale 
                   (Multon, Patton, & Kivlighan, 1996).  *p<.05, **p <.01
Preliminary Analyses. Correlations between predictor variables and the 
demographic information from this sample are presented in table 2. Certain demographic 
variables were not included in table 2 due to great variability in cell size, rendering any 
analyses with the predictor variables meaningless. For example, counselors in this sample 
were primarily Caucasian (n= 29). Thus, analyses based on counselor race would be 
meaningless in this sample.
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Table 2
Correlations Among Emotional Intelligence (Attention/Clarity),















































































.01 .01 .02 -.02 .04 .08 .03 .27* .09 .14 -.07
Note. n = 86. Trn.= Transference; Trn. Amount, Negative Trn., and Positive Trn. was 
measured by the 3- Item Transference Measure (Graff& Luborsky, 1977); Negative 
Transference * and Positive Transference* was measured by the Missouri Identifying 
Transference Scale (MITS; Multon, Patton, & Kivlighan, 1996). *p<.05, **p<.01
 Prior to testing our hypotheses, we conducted a reliability analyses for the 
measures used in this study. Cronbach’s alpha for the MITS (negative and positive 
subscales) was (.90 and .84 respectively). The alpha for the 3-item transference measure 
was adequate for research purposes (alpha= .57). Cronbach’s alpha for the insight 
measure was (.80). Reliability for the outcome measure with number one deleted was 
(cronbach’s alpha=  .71). The reliability for the attention and clarity subscales was 
(cronbach’s alpha= .90, .87 respectively). 
Main Analysis
 Consistent with expectations, emotional intelligence was positively related to 
insight. Specifically, attention was correlated with insight amount and emotional insight 
(r= .35, .37 respectively, p<. 01). Clarity was also significantly related to insight amount, 
intellectual insight, and emotional insight (r= .38, .26, .50 respectively, p <. 01). 
As hypothesized, emotional intelligence was related to transference, as measured 
by single items. Consistent with expectation, attention and clarity were negatively related 
to negative transference (r= -. 30, -. 32 respectively, p <. 01). Contrary to expectation, 
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attention and clarity were positively related to positive transference (r= .38, .28 
respectively, p <. 01). 
Since analyses showed that insight also correlated with the 3-item measure of 
transference, we tested whether emotional intelligence predicts transference over and 
above insight amount. First, we regressed negative transference on insight amount, which 
showed a significant F change of .004 (adjusted R2  = .087). Then, we regressed negative 
transference on insight amount and attention, yielding a significant F change of .037 
(adjusted R2  = .125), which suggests that attention predicts negative transference above 
and beyond insight amount. We then regressed negative transference on clarity and 
insight amount, which showed a significant F change of .031 (adjusted R2  = .128), 
suggesting that clarity predicts negative transference above and beyond insight amount.
We followed the same procedure to test whether emotional intelligence predicts 
positive transference above and beyond insight amount. We regressed positive 
transference on insight amount, which showed an F change of .000 (adjusted R2  = .144). 
Then, positive transference was regressed on insight amount and clarity, which yielded an 
F change of .146 (adjusted R2  = .156), suggesting that clarity does not predict positive 
transference above and beyond insight amount. The significant F change when positive 
transference was regressed on insight amount and attention was .01 (adjusted R2  = .202), 
suggesting that attention predicts positive transference above and beyond insight amount. 
Previous studies have reported that transference increases over time (e.g., Graff & 
Luborsky, 1977). Although this study did not rate transference over time, there was a 
significant correlation between positive transference and session number (r=. 42, p <. 01), 
and between amount of transference and session number (r=. 23, p <. 05). However, 
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negative transference and session number were not related (r=. 04, p>. 05). These 
transference ratings are from the 3-item measure of transference amount, negative, and 
positive.  
Consistent with hypothesis 3, attention was positively correlated with outcome (r= 
.23, p<. 05). Contrary to expectations, clarity was not significantly related to outcome. As 
predicted, outcome was related to insight amount (r= .25, p <. 05). However, none of the 
other insight items were related to outcome. 
We then tested the mediation hypothesis- that is, insight partially mediates the 
relationship between emotional intelligence and outcome. The first condition of this 
mediation affect is that emotional intelligence must be related to outcome. Accordingly, 
we first regressed outcome on attention (beta weight= .25, p= .03). The second condition 
is that insight must be related to outcome. We chose to use the insight amount item to test 
this hypothesis since it was the only insight item that significantly correlated with 
outcome (r= .25, p < .05). Lastly, if there is a partial mediation affect then the beta weight 
should decrease when outcome is regressed on attention and insight. When outcome was 
regressed on insight amount and attention the beta weight decreased from .25 to .16. 
Thus, as predicted insight amount is a partial mediator of attention and outcome. 
We then tested the mediation effect of insight amount on clarity and outcome. 
Clarity does not satisfy the first condition of mediation as it does not significantly 
correlate with outcome (r=. 192, p<. 05). Because the first condition was not satisfied no 
further analyses were conducted.  
This study set out to replicate the Gelso et al. (1991, 1997) interaction finding, 
that is –transference and insight interact to predict outcome. More specifically, Gelso et 
98
al. (1991) found that when transference (combined amount, positive, negative) was high, 
client insight (combined overall, intellectual, emotional) was positively related to session 
quality. In addition, Gelso et al. (1997) found a significant interaction effect for 
transference (combined single items of negative, positive, and amount) and emotional 
insight on outcome in short-term treatment. 
 Gelso et al. (1991, 1997) combined amount, negative, and positive transference 
in the linear regression analyses. In the Gelso et al. (1997) sample, the three transference 
items were interrelated (alpha= .84). However, in our sample, the low correlation 
between negative and positive transference argued against combining the items (r= -.13, p 
> .05). In addition, in our sample, transference amount, negative, and positive 
transference were poorly related (alpha= .57), also arguing against combining the items. 
The data suggests that our sample distinguished between positive and negative 
transference. On the other hand, transference amount correlated with negative and 
positive transference (r=. 43, .59, respectively, p <. 01). Since transference amount 
correlated with negative and positive transference, and to reduce the chance of a type 1 
error, we eliminated transference amount from the analyses.
In addition, the major theoretical difference between emotional and intellectual 
insight (Singer, 1970), as well as the empirical findings that distinguish the two types of 
insight (Gelso et al., 1991, 1997), and the fact that these two insights were only 
moderately correlated in our sample (r=. 35, p<. 01) all argued against combining 
intellectual and emotional insight. In sum, to test the interaction hypothesis, we 
conducted linear multiple regression analyses in which, following the procedure from 
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Gelso et al. (1997), we added the transference term first, the insight term second, and the 
interaction term last. All variables were centered to reduce multicollinearity.
Consistent with Gelso et al. (1997), transference ratings were unrelated to 
outcome in this sample. Their study found that insight and outcome were also unrelated. 
However, the authors did not ask participants to rate insight amount. In our study, insight 
amount was rated by counselors, and it significantly correlated with outcome (r= .25, p <. 
05). The insight amount item was not used in analyses because we sought to replicate as 
closely as possible the analyses in Gelso et al. (1997) which did not evaluate insight 
amount and to reduce the number of linear regressions conducted. Contrary to Gelso et al. 
(1997), transference and insight- the two predictor variables, were sometimes moderately 
related. Negative transference was negatively related to emotional insight (r=-. 30, p<. 
05), and positive transference was positively related to intellectual insight (r=. 36, p<. 01) 
and emotional insight (r=. 30, p<. 01).
Tables 3-10 present the interaction data from the eight regression analyses. Four 
regression analyses were run when transference was measured by the 3-item measure of 
transference (see tables 3-6) and four regression analyses were run when transference was 
measured by the MITS (see tables 7-10). Specifically, for therapist outcome ratings, the 
following data are given: adjusted multiple correlations for the Transference X Insight 
interaction terms, change in multiple correlations, F  changes, beta weights, and t scores. 
Confirmation of an interaction hypothesis in tables 3-10 would occur if the 
following were significant: the t score and the F ratio for the increment in multiple 
correlation when the interaction term was added to transference and insight. As shown in 
table 3, when transference was assessed using the 3-item questionnaire, t scores and the F 
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ratios for the increment in multiple correlation were nonsignificant for Positive 
Transference X Intellectual Insight, Positive Transference X Emotional Insight, and 
Negative Transference X Intellectual Insight. Negative Transference X Emotional Insight 
was the only regression to approach significance. 
Table 3
Summary of Linear Regression Analyses on Session Outcome 
With Negative Transference and Emotional Insight, and Their Interaction as Predictors
Variable Adjusted 
R2





    Negative
    Transference
.003 .015 1.23 -.12 -1.1
Step 2
     Emotional
      Insight
.003 .012 1.01 .11 1.00
Step 3
     Negative
    Transference 
X
   Emotional 
Insight
.031 .039 3.37 -.21 -1.84
Note. n = 86. Transference was assessed using the 3-item measure of transference (Graff 
& Luborsky, 1977). Negative Transference X Emotional Insight is an interaction term 




Summary of Linear Regression Analyses on Session Outcome 
With Negative Transference and Intellectual Insight, and Their Interaction as Predictors
Variable Adjusted 
R2





    Negative
    Transference
.003 .015 1.23 -.12 -1.11
Step 2
     Intellectual
      Insight
.007 .016 1.37 -.13 1.17
Step 3
     Negative
    Transference X
     Intellectual      
     Insight
.003 .008 .65 -.09 -.80
Note. n = 86. Transference was assessed using the 3-item measure of transference (Graff 
& Luborsky, 1977). Negative Transference X Intellectual Insight is an interaction term 
formed by multiplying the negative transference and intellectual insight scores.
*p<.05, **p<.01
Table 5
Summary of Linear Regression Analyses on Session Outcome 
With Positive Transference and Emotional Insight, and Their Interaction as Predictors
Variable Adjusted 
R2





    Positive
    Transference
.006 .018 1.55 .135 1.24
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Step 2
     Emotional
      Insight
.005 .010 .87 .106 .93
Step 3
     Positive
    Transference X
   Emotional 
Insight
-.007 .001 .07 -.16 -.26
Note. n = 86. Transference was assessed using the 3-item measure of transference (Graff 
& Luborsky, 1977). Positive Transference X Emotional Insight is an interaction term 
formed by multiplying the positive transference and emotional insight scores.
*p<.05, **p<.01
Table 6
Summary of Linear Regression Analyses on Session Outcome 











    Positive
    Transference
.006 .018 1.55 .135
1.24
Step 2
     Intellectual
      Insight




     Positive
    Transference 
X
    Intellectual  
    Insight
.009 .017 1.45 -.691
-1.20
Note. n = 86. Transference was assessed using the 3-item measure of transference (Graff 
& Luborsky, 1977). Positive Transference X Intellectual Insight is an interaction term 
formed by multiplying the positive transference and intellectual insight scores.
*p<.05, **p<.01ficance, significant F change = .07. 
  Our hypothesis regarding the Transference X Insight interaction reflected a 
particular form of this interaction. We expected outcomes to be most favorable when 
transference and insight were high and least favorable when transference was high and 
insight was low. To test for the form of the Negative Transference X Emotional Insight 
interaction (the only interaction that approached significance, p= .07), we calculated the 
slope of the regression line for high insight and the slope of the regression line for low 
insight. Then, using the calculated slopes and the constant from the SPSS regression print 
out, we graphed the interaction effect. The equation and solution is presented in appendix 
I. Graph 1 suggests that high insight and low insight clients both show a decrease in 
session outcome as negative transference increases. However, low insight clients show 
less of a decrease in outcome as transference increases than high insight clients. 
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We then tested this interaction hypothesis- that is, Transference X Insight predicts 
outcome, using transference scores obtained from the MITS (see tables 7-10). None of 
the four interactions (Negative Transference X Emotional Insight, Negative Transference 
X Intellectual Insight, Positive Transference X Emotional Insight, Positive Transference 
X Intellectual Insight) even approached significance
Table7
Summary of Linear Regression Analyses on Session Outcome 
With Negative Transference and Emotional Insight, and Their Interaction as Predictors
Variable Adjusted R2 Change in R2 F Increment Predictor 
          Beta
Statistics
         t
Graph 1










































.027 .017 1.46 .132 1.21
Note. n = 86. Transference was assessed using the Missouri Identifying Transference 
Scale (MITS; Multon, Patton, & Kivlighan, 1996). Negative Transference X Emotional 





Summary of Linear Regression Analyses on Session Outcome With Negative 
Transference and Intellectual Insight, and Their Interaction as Predictors
Variable Adjusted 
R2
Change in R2 F Increment Predictor 




    Negative
    Transference
.016 .028 2.34 -.167 -1.53
     Intellectual
      Insight
.021 .016 1.40 .128 1.18
Step 3
     Negative
    Transference X
     Intellectual      
     Insight
.009 .001 .051 .025 .23
Note. n = 86. Transference was assessed using the Missouri Identifying Transference 
Scale (MITS; Multon, Patton, & Kivlighan, 1996). Negative Transference X Intellectual 





Summary of Linear Regression Analyses on Session Outcome 
With Positive Transference and Emotional Insight, and Their Interaction as Predictors
Variable Adjusted 
R2





    Positive
    Transference
-.002 .010 .831 .101 .912
Step 2
     Emotional
      Insight
.-.006 .008 .662 .091 .813
Step 3
     Positive
    Transference 
X
   Emotional 
Insight
-.003 .015 .1.24 -.131 -1.11
Note. n = 86. Transference was assessed using the Missouri Identifying Transference 
Scale (MITS; Multon, Patton, & Kivlighan, 1996). Positive Transference X Emotional 





Summary of Linear Regression Analyses on Session Outcome 
With Positive Transference and Intellectual Insight, and Their Interaction as Predictors
Variable Adjusted 
R2





    Positive
    Transference
-.002 .010 .831 .101 .912
Step 2
     Intellectual
      Insight
-.001 .013 1.09 .116 1.04
Step 3
     Positive
    Transference 
X
    Intellectual  
    Insight
.-.004 .010 .78 -.10 -.88
Note. n = 86. Transference was assessed using the Missouri Identifying Transference 
Scale (MITS; Multon, Patton, & Kivlighan, 1996). Positive Transference X Intellectual 
Insight is an interaction term formed by multiplying the positive transference and 
intellectual insight scores.
*p<.05, **p<.01
Lastly, we tested the primary hypotheses of this study, that is- the high 
emotionally intelligent, high insight, and high transference group of clients will have the 
most favorable session outcome, while the low emotionally intelligent, low insight, and 
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high transference group will have the least favorable session outcome. In other words, 
there will be an interaction effect for transference and insight on session outcome for the 
high and low emotional intelligence groups. However, session outcome will be greater 
for the above average emotional intelligence group than the below average emotional 
intelligence group when viewed in the context of insight and transference. 
To test the predicted pattern, we ran eight linear regressions in which session 
outcome was the dependent variable and transference and insight were the independent 
variables. A linear regression was performed for each of the four possible combinations 
of Transference X Insight predictors.  Four regressions were run when attention was split 
into two groups (below and above average attention), and again when clarity was split 
into two groups (below and above average clarity). For both regressions, we added the 
transference term first, the insight term second, and the interaction term last. As 
elaborated above, the data argues against combining single items of transference and 
single items of insight. 
To split the data, based on level of emotional intelligence, we computed the 
sample mean for attention and for clarity, the two dimensions of emotional intelligence. 
The mean score for attention was 3.70 and the mean score for clarity was 3.10. 
Theoretically, clarity should have a lower mean than attention since it is considered to be 
a higher order skill. Since the items on the emotional intelligence measure were rated 
from 1 –5, attention scores from 1-3.70 and from 3.71 to 5 were combined into two 
groups: 1= below average attention scores and 2= above average attention scores. 
Similarly, clarity scores from 1-3.10 were categorized into group 1 (below average) and 
scores from 3.11 – 5 were categorized into group 2 (above average).
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Tables 11-18 present the interaction data pertaining to the linear regression 
analyses when transference was assessed with the 3-item questionnaire and then when it 
was assessed with the MITS. Specifically, for session outcome ratings, the following 
information is given for the below and above average emotional intelligence groups: 
adjusted multiple correlations for the Transference X Insight interaction terms, change in 
multiple correlations, F  changes, beta weights, and t scores.
Table 11
Summary of Linear Regression Analysis on Session Outcome with Emotional 
Intelligence, Emotional Insight, Negative Transference, and Their Interaction as 
Predictors when Attention and Clarity are Split
Variable Adjuste
d R2





       Step1
Negative  
Transference
-.19 .007 285 .086 .534
       Step 2
Emotional 
Insight
-.043 .003 125 -.059 -.353





-.054 .016 597 -.184 -.773
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Attention (2)
     Step 1
 Negative
Transference
.064 .086 4.028* -.293 -2.007*
     Step 2
 Emotional
 Insight
.059 .016 771 .129 .875
     Step 3
 Negative 
Transference
X Emotional  Insight
.042 .006 256 -.109 -.506
Clarity (1)
    Step 1
 Negative
 Transference
.001 .001 .062 -.038 -.248
    Step 2
 Emotional
 Insight
.024 .024 1.013 .156 1.006





.082 .082 3.762a -.443 -1.940a
Clarity (2)
 Step 1
Negative .041 .041 1.633 -.203 -1.278
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Transference
    Step 2
Emotional 
Insight
.000 .000 .002 -.008 -.047





.007 .007 .278 -.103 -.527
Note. Attention: (1) (n=40), (2) (n=45). Clarity: (1) (n=45), (2) (n=40). Attention and 
clarity have a mean of (M = 3.70, 3.10 respectively). They were split into two groups by 
the mean: (1)= group below the mean, (2)= group above the mean. Transference was 
assessed using the 3-item measure of transference (Graff & Luborsky, 1977). A = The 
change in F and the t score for Negative Transference X Emotional Insight when Clarity 
is low approaches significance (alpha = .059). *p<.05, **p<.01
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Table 12
Summary of Linear Regression Analysis on Session Outcome with Emotional 
Intelligence, Intellectual Insight, Negative Transference, and Their Interaction as 
Predictors when Attention and Clarity are Split
Variable Adjusted 
R2





       Step1
        Negative 
    Transference       
-.019 .007 285 .086 .534
       Step 2
      Intellectual
      Insight
.007 .050 1.977 .228 1.406
       Step 3
   Negative 
  Transference
  X Intellectual
  Insight
-.016 .004 154 -.072 -.393
Attention (2)
     Step 1
     Negative 
    Transference
.064 .086 4.028* -.293 -2.007*
     Step 2
    Intellectual
    Insight
.043 .001 .058 .036 .242
     Step 3
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   Negative 
  Transference
  X Intellectual Insight
.051 .029 1.355 -.295 -1.164
Clarity (1)
    Step 1
    Negative
  Transference
-.022 .001 .062 -.038 -.248
     Step 2
    Intellectual
    Insight
-.019 .026 1.131 .163 1.063
     Step 3
   Negative 
  Transference
  X Intellectual
  Insight
-.043 .000 .006 .014 .078
Clarity (2)
    Step 1
    Negative
  Transference
.016 .041 1.633 -.203 -1.278
     Step 2
    Intellectual
    Insight
-.007 .004 .143 .061 .378
     Step 3
   Negative 
  Transference
  X Intellectual
.030 .060 2.420 -.001 -.454
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  Insight
Note. Attention: (1) (n=40), (2) (n=45). Clarity: (1) (n=45), (2) (n=40). Attention and 
clarity have a mean of (M = 3.70, 3.10 respectively). They were split into two groups by 
the mean: (1)= group below the mean, (2)= group above the mean. Transference was 
assessed using the 3-item measure of transference (Graff & Luborsky, 1977).
*p<.05, **p<.01
Table 13
Summary of Linear Regression Analysis on Session Outcome with Emotional 
Intelligence, Emotional Insight, Positive Transference, and Their Interaction as 
Predictors when Attention and Clarity are Split
Variable Adjusted 
R2





       Step1
     Positive
 Transference   
.023 .048 1.934 .220 1.391
       Step 2
       Emotional
       Insight
.012 .014 552 -.120 -.743
       Step 3
   Positive
  Transference
.004 .019 730 .736 .854
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  X Emotional
  Insight
Attention (2)
       Step1
     Positive
   Transference   
-.010 .013 567 -.114 -.753
       Step 2
       Emotional
       Insight
-.005 .028 1.214 .169 1.102
       Step 3
   Positive
  Transference
  X Emotional Insight
-.003 .024 1.070 -1.079 -1.034
Clarity (1)
       Step1
     Positive
   Transference   
.020 .043 1.912 .206 1.383
       Step 2
       Emotional
       Insight
.009 .012 .527 .113 .726
       Step 3
   Positive
  Transference
  X Emotional
  Insight
-.011 .003 .145 .315 .380
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Clarity (2)
       Step1
     Positive
   Transference   
-.026 .001 .028 -.027 -.168
       Step 2
       Emotional
       Insight
-.052 .001 .042 .034 .205
       Step 3
   Positive
  Transference
  X Emotional
  Insight
-.080 .001 .040 .228 .201
Note. Attention: (1) (n=40), (2) (n=45). Clarity: (1) (n=45), (2) (n=40). Attention and 
clarity have a mean of (M = 3.70, 3.10 respectively). They were split into two groups by 
the mean: (1)= group below the mean, (2)= group above the mean. Transference was 




Summary of Linear Regression Analysis on Session Outcome with Emotional 
Intelligence, Intellectual Insight, Positive Transference, and Their Interaction as 
Predictors when Attention and Clarity are Split







       Step1
     Positive 
Transferenc
e
        .023 .048 1.934 .220 1.391
       Step 2
Intellectual 
Insight
          .018 .020 .794 .149 .891











       Step1
  Positive 
Transferenc
e
-.010 .013 .567 -.114 -.153
       Step 2
Intellectual 
Insight
-.033 .001 .035 .030 .188





-.057 .001 .051 .208 .227
Clarity (1)
       Step1
     Positive 
Transferenc
e
.020 .043 1.912 .206 1.383
       Step 2
Intellectual 
Insight
.015 .017 .750 .132 .866










       Step1
     Positive 
Transferenc
e
-.026 .001 .028 -.027 -.168
       Step 2
Intellectual 
Insight
-.049 .004 .147 .067 .383







-.078 .000 .001 -.033 -.030
Note. Attention: (1) (n=40), (2) (n=45). Clarity: (1) (n=45), (2) (n=40). Attention and 
clarity have a mean of (M = 3.70, 3.10 respectively). They were split into two groups by 
the mean: (1)= group below the mean, (2)= group above the mean. Transference was 




Summary of Linear Regression Analysis on Session Outcome with Emotional 
Intelligence, Emotional Insight, Negative Transference, and Their Interaction as 
Predictors when Attention and Clarity are Split
Variable Adjust
ed R2





       Step1
     Negative
    Transference
.036 .061 .124 -.247 -1.572
       Step 2
      Emotional
      Insight
.015 .005 .671 -.068 -.428
       Step 3
   Negative 
  Transference
   X Emotional
   Insight
.013 .023 .349 .187 .949
Attention (2)
       Step1
     Negative
    Transference
-.021 .003 .733 -.053 -.344
       Step 2
      Emotional
      Insight
-.023 .021 .350 .146 .946
       Step 3
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 Negative  
Transference X 
Emotional Insight
-.033 .015 .428 .152 .800
Clarity (1)
       Step1
     Negative
    Transference
.038 .060 2.741 -.245 -1.656
       Step 2
      Emotional
      Insight
.043 .027 1.243 .164 1.115
       Step 3
   Negative 
  Transference
   X Emotional
   Insight
.023 .003 .126 -.066 -.355
Clarity (2)
       Step1
     Negative
    Transference
-.023 .004 .142 -.062 -.377
       Step 2
      Emotional
      Insight
-.049 .002 .072 .045 .267
       Step 3
   Negative 
  Transference
   X Emotional
-.011 .063 2.385 .354 1.544
123
   Insight
Note. Attention: (1) (n=40), (2) (n=44). Clarity: (1) (n=45), (2) (n=39). Attention and 
clarity have a mean of (M = 3.70, 3.10 respectively). They were split into two groups by 
the mean: (1)= group below the mean, (2)= group above the mean. Transference was 
assessed using Missouri Identifying Transference Scale (Multon, Patton, & Kivlighan, 
1996).*p<.05, **p<.01
Table 16
Summary of Linear Regression Analysis on Session Outcome with Emotional 
Intelligence, Intellectual Insight, Negative Transference, and Their Interaction as 
Predictors when Attention and Clarity are Split
Variable Adjust
ed R2





       Step1
        Negative
    Transference
.036 .061 2.471 -.247 -1.572
       Step 2
      Intellectual
      Insight
.038 .026 1.066 .165 1.033
       Step 3
    Negative
   Transference
   X Intellectual
    Insight
.039 .025 1.034 -.179 -1.017
Attention (2)
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       Step1
        Negative
    Transference
-.021 .003 .118 -.053 -.344
       Step 2
      Intellectual
      Insight
-.046 .000 .003 -.009 -.057
       Step 3
    Negative
   Transference
   X Intellectual 
Insight
-.070 .002 .085 .058 .292
Clarity (1)
       Step1
        Negative
    Transference
.038 .060 2.741 -.245 -1.656
       Step 2
      Intellectual
      Insight
.033 .017 .792 .133 .890
       Step 3
    Negative
   Transference
   X Intellectual
    Insight
.011 .001 .043 -.034 -.208
Clarity (2)
       Step1
        Negative -.023 .004 .142 -.062 -.377
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    Transference
       Step 2
      Intellectual
      Insight
-.048 .003 .110 .056 .332
       Step 3
    Negative
   Transference
   X Intellectual
    Insight
-.078 .001 .024 -.041 -.154
Note. Attention: (1) (n=40), (2) (n=44). Clarity: (1) (n=45), (2) (n=39). Attention and 
clarity have a mean of (M = 3.70, 3.10 respectively). They were split into two groups by 
the mean: (1)= group below the mean, (2)= group above the mean. Transference was 
assessed using Missouri Identifying Transference Scale (Multon, Patton, & Kivlighan, 
1996).*p<.05, **p<.01
Table 17
Summary of Linear Regression Analysis on Session Outcome with Emotional 
Intelligence, Emotional Insight, Positive Transference, and Their Interaction as 
Predictors when Attention and Clarity are Split
Variable Adjust
ed R2





       Step1
    Positive
   Transference   
.004 .030 1.141 .173 1.068
       Step 2
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  Emotional
   Insight
.020 .041 1.606 -.204 -1.267
       Step 3
   Positive
   Transference
    X Emotional
    Insight
.022 .028 1.095 -.225 -1.046
Attention (2)
       Step1
    Positive
   Transference   
-.024 .000 .003 .008 .050
       Step 2
   Emotional
   Insight
-.031 .018 .736 .135 .858
       Step 3
   Positive
   Transference
    X Emotional 
Insight
-.057 .000 .004 -.010 -.060
Clarity (1)
       Step1
    Positive
   Transference   
.044 .066 2.959 .257 1.720
       Step 2
   Emotional
   Insight
.029 .009 .387 .094 .622
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       Step 3
   Positive
   Transference
    X Emotional
    Insight
.008 .003 .117 -.078 -.343
Clarity (2)
       Step1
    Positive
   Transference   
-.017 .011 .388 -.103 -.623
       Step 2
   Emotional
   Insight
-.042 .004 .135 .065 .367
       Step 3
   Positive
   Transference
    X Emotional
    Insight
-.072 .000 .000 -.003 -.014
Note. Attention: (1) (n=40), (2) (n=44). Clarity: (1) (n=44), (2) (n=38). Attention and 
clarity have a mean of (M = 3.70, 3.10 respectively). They were split into two groups by 
the mean: (1)= group below the mean, (2)= group above the mean. Transference was 




Summary of Linear Regression Analysis on Session Outcome with Emotional 
Intelligence, Intellectual Insight, Positive Transference, and Their Interaction as 
Predictors when Attention and Clarity are Split
Variable Adjust
ed R2





       Step1
     Positive
    Transference
.004 .030 1.141 .173 1.068
       Step 2
      Intellectual
      Insight
.012 .034 1.315 .185 1.147
       Step 3
   Positive
  Transference
  X Intellectual
   Insight
.105 .112 4.745* -.361 -2.178*
Attention (2)
       Step1
     Positive
    Transference
-.024 .000 .003 .008 .050
       Step 2
   Intellectual
      Insight
-.049 .001 .023 -.024 -.150
       Step 3
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   Positive
  Transference
  X Intellectual Insight
-.044 .030 1.187 .175 1.090
Clarity (1)
       Step1
     Positive
    Transference
.044 .066 2.959 .257 1.720
       Step 2
      Intellectual
      Insight
.043 .022 .989 .148 .995
       Step 3
   Positive
  Transference
  X Intellectual
   Insight
.129 .102 5.011* -.351 -2.238*
Clarity (2)
       Step1
     Positive
    Transference
-.017 .011 .388 -.103 -.623
       Step 2
      Intellectual
      Insight
-.043 .003 .101 .054 .318
       Step 3
   Positive
  Transference
  X Intellectual
.017 .083 3.122 .316 1.767
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   Insight
Note. Attention: (1) (n=40), (2) (n=44). Clarity: (1) (n=45), (2) (n=38). Attention and 
clarity have a mean of (M = 3.70, 3.10 respectively). They were split into two groups by 
the mean: (1)= group below the mean, (2)= group above the mean. Transference was 
assessed using Missouri Identifying Transference Scale (Multon, Patton, & Kivlighan, 
1996).*p<.05, **p<.01
As shown in table 14, t scores and the increment in multiple correlation were 
significant for Positive Transference X Intellectual Insight when attention was low 
(p=.036) and when clarity was low (p=.031), when transference was measured by the 
MITS.  We predicted a particular pattern for the interaction effect. Specifically, high 
attention (i.e., emotional intelligence), high insight, and high transference would predict 
the most successful session outcome, while low attention, low insight, and high 
transference would predict the lowest session outcome. To test for this pattern of the 
interaction effect, we calculated the slope for the regression line for the four 
insight/attention groups: high insight and high attention, low insight and high attention, 
high insight and low attention, and low insight and low attention. Using the calculated 
slopes and the constant from the SPSS regression output we graphed four regression 
lines, one for each insight/ attention group. We graphed the regression lines for the high 
attention groups, although they were not significant, to compare the general direction and 
trend of the high attention groups to the low attention groups. 
The regression lines suggest that low attention, high intellectual insight, and high 
positive transference predict the lowest session outcome. On the other hand, high 
intellectual insight, high attention, and high transference predict the most favorable 
session outcome. However, results obtained for the high attention group were 
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nonsignificant (p=.283). Interestingly, the low insight/ low attention group showed only a 
slight decrease in outcome as transference increased. The calculations for the regression 
lines for Attention, Intellectual Insight, Positive Transference, and Session Outcome are 
included in appendix J and the graph is presented in graph 2. 
Positive transference and intellectual insight showed a similar pattern when 
viewed in the context of Clarity, the other dimension of emotional intelligence. 
Specifically, high positive transference, high intellectual insight, and low clarity showed 
the least favorable session outcome, whereas high clarity, high intellectual insight, and 
high positive transference showed the most favorable session outcome. The interaction 
Graph 2
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Low Intellectual Insight/ Low Attention
High Intellectual Insight/ High
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effect for high attention approached significance (p=.086). The low clarity/ low 
intellectual insight group shows almost no change in session outcome as positive 
transference increases. 
The calculations for the regression lines for Clarity, Intellectual Insight, Positive 
Transference, and Session Outcome are included in appendix K and the 
graph is presented in graph 3.
Graph 3
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T scores and the increment in multiple correlation approached significance for 
Negative Transference X Emotional Insight when Clarity was low (p=.059), when 
transference was measured by the 3-item questionnaire. All other possible interaction 
affects (when transference was assessed with the MITS or the 3-item questionnaire) were 
nonsignificant. We followed the same procedure to test the pattern for the interaction 
effect for Clarity, Negative Transference, Emotional Insight, and Session Outcome. We 
calculated the slope of the regression line for the low clarity/high insight group and the 
slope for the low clarity/low insight group. Using the calculated slopes and constant from 
the SPSS print out of the regression, we graphed the interaction effect. The interaction 
effect for high clarity could not be included as a comparison because the unstandardized 
betas were too small to use to calculate the slopes of the regression lines. The calculations 
are included in appendix L. Graph 4 shows that in our sample, low clarity, high emotional 
insight, and high negative transference predict the least successful session outcome. The 
low clarity/ low emotional insight group only slightly decreases in session outcome as 
negative transference increases.  
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The data suggests an interaction affect for Attention X Negative Transference on 
outcome, when negative transference was measured by the 3-item questionnaire. The two 
predictors- negative transference and attention are moderately correlated (r= .30, p<. 01). 
The variables were centered to reduce multicollinearity. Attention was entered first, 
negative transference was entered second, and the interaction term was entered last. The 
change in F was significant (p=.03). Table 19 presents the adjusted multiple correlations 
for the Attention X Negative Transference interaction terms, change in multiple 
Graph 4
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correlations, F changes, beta weights, and t scores. To test for the pattern of the 
interaction we computed the slope of the regression line for the high attention group and 
the slope of the regression line for the low attention group. The calculations are included 
in appendix M. Graph 5 shows that as negative transference increased, session outcome 
decreased for both the high attention and the low attention groups. However, session 
outcome for the low attention group was relatively more successful as compared to the 
high attention group.  
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     Table 19
     Summary of Linear Regression Analyses on Session Outcome 
         With Negative Transference and Attention, and Their Interaction as Predictors
Variable Adjusted
R2
Change in R2 F Increment Predictor
     Beta
Statistics
          t
Step1
    Attention .043 .054 4.84 .233 2.20
Step 2
     Negative 
Transference
.035 .003 .255 -.056 -.505
Graph 5




























Overall, the results support the hypothesis that emotional intelligence is positively 
related to insight. Interestingly, the two dimensions of emotional intelligence (attention 
and clarity) correlate somewhat differently with intellectual and emotional insight. 
Specifically, attention does not significantly correlate with intellectual insight while 
clarity does significantly correlate with intellectual insight, r=. 26, p<. 01. Attention and 
clarity both significantly correlate with emotional insight, r=. 37, .50, p<. 01, 
respectively. 
Given the moderate effect sizes, the data suggests that emotional intelligence and 
insight are related yet distinct constructs. It was hypothesized that emotional intelligence 
and insight would be correlated because emotional intelligence is a set of skills that aid 
the client in achieving insight. Another explanation is that emotional intelligence and 
insight are related because of a third mediating variable. Perhaps emotional intelligence 
enables clients to understand and internalize therapist interpretations, which then lead to 
client insight. 
An r to z transformation was run for the correlations between clarity and 
intellectual insight and clarity and emotional insight. The difference approached 
significance (p=.07), suggesting that clarity has a stronger relationship to emotional 
insight than intellectual insight. One explanation as to why emotional intelligence and 
emotional insight are more highly correlated than emotional intelligence and intellectual 
insight is that emotional intelligence is a set of skills that help clients to understand 
themselves on an emotional level. The very definition of emotional insight, as offered by 
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Gelso et al. (1997), is the connection between what the mind knows and what the heart 
believes. 
In light of the theory of emotional intelligence, another way of wording the 
definition of emotional insight is an understanding of oneself that comes from 
understanding one’s emotions. Emotional intelligence is suggested to be those set of 
skills that aid one in understanding one’s emotions. Clarity in particular assesses the 
degree to which one understands one’s emotions. For example, one clarity item (reversed 
scored) asks therapists to rate the following sentence, “My client can’t make sense of his 
or her feelings.” Accordingly, it is hypothesized that clarity and emotional insight have 
the strongest relationship, compared to other combinations of emotional intelligence and 
types of insight, because clarity symbolizes a set of skills necessary to understand oneself 
on an affective level.  
As hypothesized, emotional intelligence was related to transference. As expected, 
emotional intelligence was negatively related to negative transference. In addition, 
attention and clarity predict negative transference above and beyond insight amount. 
Attention predicts positive transference above and beyond insight. However, clarity does 
not predict transference above and beyond insight amount. Overall, the results suggest 
that emotional intelligence predicts transference, even when level of insight is accounted 
for. 
The data did not support the hypothesis that positive transference is negatively 
related to emotional intelligence. Instead, the data suggests that positive transference is 
positively related to emotional intelligence. One explanation is that positive transference 
is more comfortable for both therapist and client to discuss and interpret, creating a space 
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for therapists to observe their client’s emotional intelligence when interpreting the 
transference. Another explanation is that therapists perceive positive projections from the 
client as more accurate than negative ones.
Recent research suggests that the level of transference follows a different course 
in short-term and long-term therapy (see Gelso et al., 1997, Graff & Luborsky, 1977). 
These conflicting results lead to many empirical questions as to the course of transference 
in psychotherapy. Although this study did not follow transference over time, the results 
found a significant correlation between positive transference, amount of transference and 
session number. However, negative transference and session number were not related. 
Studies that look at transference over time in long-term therapy are needed to understand 
how negative and positive transference grow and decline over time. These findings 
suggest that negative and positive transference operate differently in therapy and should 
be studied as related yet distinct concepts. 
The hypotheses that emotional intelligence and insight would both significantly 
relate to session outcome were partially supported. While attention has a small 
correlation with outcome, clarity did not significantly correlate with outcome. One 
explanation for this is that attention reflects the patient’s ability to perceive and identify 
feelings, which is often considered a therapeutic goal and even outcome by many 
therapists. On the other hand, clarity more closely resembles insight, as it measures one’s 
skill in making sense of one’s emotions. Clinical experience and research suggest that, in 
isolation, understanding one’s emotions does not lead to change. Therapists may not 
associate clarity, in isolation, with a successful outcome. Instead, therapists may look 
toward what clients actually do with these skills when assessing outcome. Another 
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explanation is that the session outcome measure used in this study did not capture the 
dimension(s) of session quality that correlate with clarity. For example, perhaps clarity 
correlates with the “depth” of a session, as measure by the Session Evaluation 
Questionnaire, as the client more deeply experiences his/her emotions as he/she more 
clearly understands them. 
Similarly, the relationship between insight and outcome was mixed. Insight 
amount was the only insight item to significantly relate to outcome. The literature is also 
in conflict over whether insight predicts outcome (see Kivlighan et al., 2000, Gelso et al., 
1997). The findings of this study suggest that emotional insight and intellectual insight do 
not predict session outcome. Perhaps emotional intelligence and insight are similar in 
that, in isolation, neither leads to outcome, yet when taken into consideration with other 
variables, both influence outcome in psychotherapy. Another explanation is that 
emotional intelligence and insight may predict outcome over the course of therapy, as this 
study involved only one session of psychotherapy. Again, perhaps a different session 
outcome measure would have captured some quality of a session that does relate to 
insight, as the session outcome measure used in this study only assessed the degree to 
which a therapist valued a session. 
The results of the mediation hypothesis were mixed. The findings suggest that 
insight amount is a partial mediator of attention and session outcome. However, insight 
cannot be a partial mediator of clarity and session outcome since clarity is not 
significantly related to outcome. The results give some support to the proposition that 
emotional intelligence is a set of skills that if used effectively by the client can lead to 
insight. 
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      Overall, the results did not support the Gelso et al. (1991, 1997) interaction 
effect- that is, transference and insight interact to predict outcome. However, the data 
suggests that certain combinations of transference and insight predict outcome. As 
measured by the 3-item measure of transference, Negative Transference X Emotional 
Insight approached significance in predicting session outcome (p=. 07). The particular 
pattern of this interaction effect was inconsistent with past research (Gelso et al., 1991, 
1997). In the sample for this study, high emotional insight and high negative transference 
predicted poor session outcome. Clients in the low insight group showed a relatively 
favorable session outcome when negative transference and emotional insight were high 
as compared to the high insight group. The data suggests that in our sample, clients did 
not use insight to manage, or work through, the transference. An alternative explanation 
for the unexpected pattern of the interaction effect is that transference and insight operate 
differently in long term therapy than in short term therapy, affecting the specific pattern 
of the transference X insight interaction effect. Past research suggests that the course of 
transference differs in short term and long term treatment (Graff et al., 1997 & Gelso et 
al., 1997). The sample in the present study differs from samples used in past research on 
the interaction effect of transference and insight in that the sample of this study consists 
of clients in mostly long-term treatment and, at the same time, has great variability in 
length of treatment. 
Several possible explanations exist for the discrepancy between the results of this 
study and previous research. First, while Gelso et al. (1991, 1997) combined transference 
items to form the transference term that was entered into the regressions, the sample of 
this study distinguished between positive and negative transference. Thus, we treated 
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positive and negative transference as separate items and did not combine them for the 
analyses. Second, Gelso et al. (1997) found transference X insight interaction effects on 
outcome from a sample in short-term therapy. Our sample consisted of clients primarily 
in long-term therapy. The mean session number was 70. Perhaps transference and insight 
operate differently in long-term therapy than short-term therapy. Third, our session 
outcome measure had poor variability (M=4.12, SD=. 83). Further analyses may have 
been impacted by little variability in ratings of session outcome. Lastly, there were no 
significant interaction findings when transference was assessed with the MITS. While the 
MITS has excellent psychometric properties, it may underreport the amount of 
transference present in a session. For example, a client may show very high levels of one 
adjective describing negative transference but not on others. 
The surprising lack of significant interaction findings, as well as the surprising 
pattern of the negative transference X emotional insight interaction effect, makes more 
sense when emotional intelligence is taken into consideration. Positive transference and 
intellectual insight were not found to significantly interact to predict session outcome. 
However, when this interaction effect is viewed in context of high and low emotional 
intelligence, positive transference and intellectual insight significantly interact to predict 
outcome when attention and clarity are low. Similarly, negative transference and 
emotional insight interact to significantly predict session outcome when clarity is low. 
These three significant interactions displayed the same pattern as negative 
transference and emotional insight did when predicting outcome, that is- outcome 
decreased for high and low insight groups as transference increased. To help make sense 
of this unexpected pattern, we graphed the nonsignificant interaction effects of positive 
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transference and intellectual insight when emotional intelligence was high. We could not 
graph negative transference X emotional insight for high clarity because the 
unstandardized beta coefficients were too small. For clients in the above average 
emotional intelligence group, outcome increased for high and low insight groups as 
transference increased, resembling past findings and the hypotheses of this study. 
More specifically, low attention, high insight, and high positive transference 
predicted the lowest session outcome in our sample. On the other hand, high intellectual 
insight, high attention, and high transference predicted the most favorable session 
outcome. Similarly, the positive transference X intellectual insight interaction when 
clarity was high showed the same pattern. These findings suggest that relatively low 
emotionally intelligent clients were rated as having a less favorable session outcome than 
high emotionally intelligent clients did, even when insight and transference are both high. 
On the other hand, there is a trend in the data that suggests that emotional intelligence 
equips the client to utilize his or her insight in working through the transference. 
The pattern of the interaction effect for negative transference and emotional 
insight, when clarity is low, is similar to other significant transference and insight 
interaction effects when emotional intelligence is low. In this case, low clarity, high 
emotional insight, and high negative transference predicted the least successful session 
outcome. On the other hand, low clarity, low emotional insight, and high negative 
transference predict the most successful session outcome, although session outcome still 
decreased. Although this pattern is surprising, one explanation is that insight, without the 
skills (i.e., emotional intelligence) to effectively utilize it, actually hinders the therapeutic 
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process. Since numerous regressions were conducted, an alternative explanation behind 
the regression results is that the significant interaction effect findings were due to chance. 
Although there were several significant interaction findings, most of the 
interaction effects, using either of the two transference measures, were nonsignificant. 
Little outcome in session variability may have affected the interaction results. In addition, 
when analyzing transference X insight interactions in context of emotional intelligence, 
the sample’s N was divided into high and low emotional intelligence groups. Thus, the 
sample size decreased; consequently the power also decreased, perhaps masking 
significant results. 
Limitations
There are several limitations to this study. Transference and insight were 
measured from the vantage point of the clinician. While the clinician’s view of 
transference and insight is certainly important, it is still subjective. Also, there could have 
been a therapist bias in the transference ratings. Specifically, some therapists may have 
rated client transference higher or lower in general. However, the data did not suggest 
that there was a significant therapist bias in the transference ratings. On the other hand, 
looking at transference and insight from a therapist’s perspective could be helpful for 
clinicians in their work with clients. Also, transference can work unconsciously; thus, 
client ratings might be less valid. Past studies have relied on measures of transference and 
insight from the vantage point of the therapist (e.g., Gelso, Hill, & Kivlighan, 1991; 
Gelso, Kivlighan, Wine, Jones, & Friedman, 1997).
All the variables measured in this study were assessed by the therapist, including 
transference, insight, emotional intelligence, and session outcome. Using the same 
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source, i.e., the therapist, as the sole rater of the variables under investigation might 
inflate the results. In particular, future research should look at emotional intelligence and 
session outcome from the vantage point of the client. Although the measure used in this 
study to assess emotional intelligence was based on the ability model, to derive a true 
index of client emotional intelligence, clients must be administered the ability-based test. 
In addition, numerous studies have shown that clients and therapists have different 
interpretations of session outcome, as the literature suggests they value different aspects 
of the session.  
Both the construct and the measure of emotional intelligence are in their infant 
stages of development. The validity and reliability results for the measure are promising.  
Yet, we must proceed with caution when generalizing and accepting any finding 
involving emotional intelligence at this point (Mayer et al., 2003). The popular press has 
given much attention to the concept of emotional intelligence (e.g., Martinez, 1997; 
Blackburn, 1996). However, these sources usually proceed from a mixed model of 
emotional intelligence that is empirically unsound. This study addresses the “buzz” 
around emotional intelligence from an ability-based model. 
 This study did not have direct manipulation over the variables, and thus it is not 
an experimental design. Consequently, cause and effect relationships cannot be inferred 
(Pedhazur, 1997). The sample size for this study was adequate in comparison to similar 
psychotherapy studies. However, a larger N, and thus more power, may have been 
necessary to detect significant interaction findings, especially when emotional 
intelligence was divided into high and low groups.
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Implications 
This was the first study to examine the application of emotional intelligence in the 
real world setting of psychotherapy. For many psychodynamic therapists, transference 
and insight are at the center of the therapeutic work. The findings from this study suggest 
that emotional intelligence predicts the level of transference and insight. In addition, the 
data suggests that emotional intelligence is a set of skills that the client can use to achieve 
insight, implying that insight can come from within the client, as opposed to the 
traditional psychodynamic theory that client insight is achieved with the aid of therapist 
interpretations. 
These findings are important for several reasons. First, as a new construct, a major 
empirical question is whether emotional intelligence matters in the real world? The 
relationship between emotional intelligence and insight, and between emotional 
intelligence and transference, suggest that emotional intelligence does account for some 
variability in the real world setting of psychotherapy. The significant relationship 
between emotional intelligence and certain client variables in real life settings give 
support for the predictive validity of emotional intelligence. Overall, the size of the 
correlations in this study are moderate. This is consistent with other studies that usually 
find moderate size correlations between emotional intelligence, as well as general 
intelligence, and other predictor variables and outcomes in real world settings. 
Second, past research has focused on the effect of therapist interpretations on 
client insight. The findings of this study support the hypothesis that therapist 
interpretations are not the only factor that contributes to client insight; client insight can 
occur with the help of the client’s own set of skills. Third, there is an ongoing debate in 
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the literature over whether psychological mindedness and insight are distinct concepts. 
However, the moderate correlations between emotional intelligence and insight, as well 
as the finding that emotional intelligence predicts transference above and beyond insight, 
suggest that insight and emotional intelligence are related yet distinct concepts. 
Finally, the significant relationship between transference and emotional 
intelligence lends mixed support for this paper's theory on the relationship between 
emotional intelligence and transference. More specifically, it is assumed that emotional 
intelligence is a set of skills that helps clients to work through the transference. 
Emotional intelligence involves discerning which emotions are most adaptive to feel in a 
given situation, while transference involves unconscious feelings generalized across 
many interpersonal contexts. The unexpected finding that positive transference is 
positively related to emotional intelligence does not support the proposed relationship 
between emotional inteligence and transference. Further research is needed to 
understand the relationship between emotional intelligence and transference.
From the interaction data, there is some support to suggest that clients with high 
emotional intelligence have the ability to use insight to work through the transference, 
predicting a successful session outcome. On the other hand, clients with low emotional 
intelligence do not seem to readily possess the skills necessary to utilize insight in a given 
session. In other words, the pattern of interaction effects suggest that insight is helpful in 
working through the transference in a psychotherapy session when clients possess the 
skills (i.e., emotional intelligence) to constructively utilize insight
Future research. Overall, the data suggests that emotional intelligence influences 
the level of transference and insight, future research needs to ask- how do therapists 
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attend to and teach emotional intelligence? Is emotional intelligence taught implicitly 
through a good therapeutic relationship, as the therapist models an emotionally intelligent 
way of thinking? Is it a set of behavioral skills that can be taught in a classroom setting? 
Perhaps emotional intelligence is not something that can be didactically taught to clients, 
but something that is learned through deeply experiencing it within the context of the 
therapeutic relationship. Before these questions can be answered, future research is 
needed to replicate and expand the findings of this study. For example, what is the role of 
emotional intelligence over time in psychotherapy? What is its relationship to 
transference, insight, and session outcome when the client rates emotional intelligence 
and session outcome? Future research is also needed to investigate the transference X 
insight interaction on session outcome since the results of this study differed somewhat 
from past findings. More research is needed in the area of emotional intelligence and 
psychotherapy. This study served to provide initial support that client emotional 
intelligence is related to central constructs in therapy, suggesting that it is an important 




1) What session number did you and the client just complete? _______
2) Is this particular client in short-term or long-term counseling?
3) Counselor Sex:  Female ______   Male ____
4) Client Sex: Female ____    Male _____
5) Counselor Age: ______
6) Counselor Race: African- American _______         Asian________     
Hispanic ______   Caucasian ______     Other (please specify) ______
7) Client Race: African- American _______         Asian________     
Hispanic ______   Caucasian ______     Other (please specify) ______
8) Highest Degree Earned by Counselor: __________
9) Are you currently in Training? Yes____        No _____    (If “no”, skip to number 13)
10) Number of prior practicum courses in counseling (including prepracticum): _______
11) Practicum Site (e.g., counseling center):  __________
12) Supervisor’s orientation: Psychoanalytic/Psychodynamic______
Humanistic/ Existential_______  Cognitive/Behavioral______
13) Where is your primary placement (e.g., counseling center, private practice)?  ______
14) Prior clinical experience: _____ month(s) (or ______ years)
15) What orientation do your techniques most closely follow: 
Psychoanalytic/Psychodynamic ________Humanistic/ Existential_______  
Cognitive/Behavioral______
16) How long after the session are you filling out these questionnaires?________
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17) Please briefly describe client issues discussed in therapy?
18) Is this your First___  Second___ or Third___ session rating
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Appendix B
Therapy Session Check Sheet
Directions:  Please complete the items below immediately after each session or as soon as 
possible within 24 hours after each session.
Transference: The degree to which the client is dealing with material that is overtly or 
covertly related to the therapist. This material must be a manifestation of or a 
displacement from an early important relationship(s). The previous person (or
transference source), however, need not be mentioned; he or she may be inferred. Thus, 
transference from the client to the therapist may be inferred because of, for example, the 
presence of distortion, strong affect, inappropriate affect, etc. 
Transference may be positive or negative. The client may project positive attitudes onto 
the counselor, based on needs tied to past conflictual relationships. For example, because 
of the client’s depravations with a parent, she or he may need to see the counselor as 
more loving or powerful than is realistically the case. On the other hand, the client may 
project negative attitudes onto the counselor, based on needs tied to past conflictual 
relationships. For example, because of the client’s experience with a parent, she or he 
may react to the therapist as if the therapist does not like him or her, is being critical, will 
abandon him or her, is not trustworthy, and so on. 
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                                  None                  Some         Moderate      Much     Very Much
                                 or Slight
Transference:
Amount                        1                       2                3                  4                5
Positive                        1                       2                3                  4                5
Negative                        1                       2                3                  4                5
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Appendix C
Missouri Identifying Transference Scale
Directions. During the session you just completed, the client had the following unrealistic 
reactions:
Not evident                                                           Very 
evident
1. fear                                       1               2               3               4               5     
2. love                                      1               2               3               4               5
3. anger                                    1               2               3               4               5
4. sexual longing                      1               2               3               4                5
5. admiration                            1               2               3               4                5
6. withdrawal                           1               2               3               4               5
7. idealization                           1               2               3               4               5
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8. protectiveness                       1               2               3               4               5
9. flirtatiousness                       1               2               3               4               5
10. seductiveness                       1               2               3               4               5
11. clinging                          1               2               3              4                  5                         
12. dependence                 1               2               3             4                   5
13. argumentativeness               1               2               3               4               5        
14. suspiciousness                     1               2               3               4               5
15. blandness                             1               2               3               4               5
16. amorousness                 1               2               3               4               5
17. passivity    1               2               3               4               5
18. infatuation                            1               2               3               4               5
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During the session just completed, the client had the following unrealistic reactions:
Not evident                                                     Very 
evident
19. envy                                              1               2               3               4               5
20. dislike 1               2               3               4               5
21. persistent reasonableness 1               2               3               4               5
22. contempt 1               2               3               4               5
23. tenderness 1               2               3               4               5
24. belligerence            1               2               3               4               5
25. mistrust 1               2               3               4               5
26. annoyance 1               2               3               4               5
27. resentment 1               2               3               4               5
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28. indifference 1               2               3               4               5
29. ambivalence 1               2               3               4               5
30. capriciousness 1               2               3               4               5
31. controlled             1               2               3               4               5
32. uncared- for 1               2               3               4               5
33. ridicule 1               2               3               4               5
34. rigidity 1               2               3               4               5
35. rage            1               2               3               4               5
36. loathing 1               2               3               4               5
37. bitterness 1               2               3               4               5
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Appendix D
Relationship Questionnaire: Insight Scale
Directions:  Please complete the items below immediately after each session or as soon as 
possible within 24 hours after each session.
Insight. Extent to which client displays accurate understanding of material being 
explored. Understanding may be of the relationship, client’s functioning outside of 
counseling, or aspects of the client’s dynamics and behavior. Intellectual insight reflects 
an understanding of the cause-effect relationships but lacks depth because it does not 
connect to affects underlying client’s thoughts. Emotional insight connects affect and 
intellect; the client is thus connected emotionally to his or her understanding. 
                             None or             Somewhat     Moderate      Much     Very Much
Slight
Insight:
Amount                        1                           2                       3                  4                 5
Intellectual                   1                           2                       3                  4                 5




Please complete the following questionnaire based on your experience of the client. Read 
each statement and decide whether or not you agree with it. Place a number in the blank 
line next to each statement using the following scale:
             5= strongly agree
4= somewhat agree
3= neither agree nor disagree
2= somewhat disagree
1= strongly disagree
Please answer the following questions based on your perception of the client.
___ 1. My client thinks that people would be better off if they felt less and thought more.
___ 2. My client doesn’t think its worth paying attention to emotions or moods. 
___ 3. My client doesn’t usually care much about what she or he is feeling.
___ 4. Sometimes my client can’t tell what his or her feelings are.
___ 5. My client is rarely confused about how he or she feels.
___ 6. My client believes that feelings give direction to life.
___ 7. My client believes in acting from the heart.
___ 8. My client can never tell how he or she feels.
___ 9. My client thinks that the best way for him or her to handle his or her feelings is    
          to experience them to the fullest.
___ 10. My client’s beliefs and opinions always seem to change depending on how he     
            or she feels.
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___ 11. My client is often aware of his or her feelings on a matter.
___ 12. My client is usually confused about how he or she feels.
___ 13. My client thinks that one should never be guided by emotions.
___ 14. My client never gives into his or her emotions.
___ 15. My client feels at ease about his or her emotions.
___ 16. My client pays a lot of attention to how he or she feels.
___ 17. My client can’t make sense of his or her feelings.
___ 18. My client doesn’t pay much attention to his or her feelings.
___ 19. My client often thinks about his or her feelings.
___ 20. My client is usually very clear about his or her feelings.
___ 21. My client thinks that feelings are a weakness humans have.
___ 22. My client usually knows his or her feelings about a matter.
___ 23. My client thinks that it is usually a waste of time to think about your emotions. 




Directions: Answer each question as it applies to your perception of the quality of the 
session just completed. Please use the 5-point scale below to answer each question. The 
scale ranges from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5).
I . . . 
Am glad I attended this session.
1          2          3          4          5
Did not feel satisfied with what I got out of this session.
1          2          3          4          5
Thought the session was helpful.
1          2          3          4          5
Did not think the session was valuable.





Statement of Age:      I state that I am at least 18 years of age, in good physical health,  
                                   and wish to participate in a program of research being conducted
      by Rayna Markin under the guidance of Dr. Dennis Kivlighan in 
                       the Department of Counseling and Personnel Services at the 
                       University of Maryland, College Park
Procedures:   The procedure of this study requires counselors to complete five brief 
questionnaires after a counseling session for up to three clients. 
Participation in this research project requires approximately 8-10 Minutes 
per client.
Confidentiality: All information collected in this study is confidential and my name 
                                  will not be identified at any time. The data I provide will be 
                                   grouped with data others provide for reporting and presentation.
Risks: I understand that there are no known risks for me if I participate in
                                   this study.
Benefits, Freedom    The experiment is not designed to help me personally, but to help 
to Withdraw, &        the investigator learn more about client characteristics and session 
Ability to Ask           outcome in counseling. I am free to ask questions or withdraw from
Questions: participation at any time and without penalty.
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Medical Care           The University of Maryland does not provide any medical or     
                                  Hospitalization insurance for participants in this research study nor 
                                  will the University of Maryland provide any compensation for any 
                            injury sustained as a result of participation in this research study, 
                                  except as required by law. 
Contact Information: Rayna Markin, Counseling and Personnel Services Department, 
                        College Park, MD, 29742  Phone: 301-405-8485  
                                     Email: rmarkin@wam.umd.edu
                                     Email of principal investigator: dennisk@wam.umd.edu
Printed Name of Participant ________________________________________




Please fill out these questionnaires after your NEXT three sessions with clients in the 
middle of counseling. Please do not self-select the sessions you will rate.
1) After your next counseling session with a client in the middle of treatment (short-term 
treatment: 3rd-10th session, long-term treatment: after the first month and before the last 
month of counseling) please complete the questionnaires in the packet provided. 
2) Please fill out the questionnaires immediately after the counseling session or as soon as 
possible thereafter within 24 hours. The questionnaires should take approximately 8-10 
minutes to complete.
3) Please repeat this procedure with your next two clients in the middle of 
treatment. In other words, please complete a packet of questionnaires after one session 
in the middle of counseling for three different clients.
4) Please return the questionnaires within four weeks of receiving them in the return 
envelope provided. 
Thank you for your participation and cooperation.
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Appendix I
Below are the calculations for the Negative Transference X Emotional Insight 
on Session Outcome regression lines. Negative transference was assessed using the 3-
item measure of transference.
• Significant F change= .07
• Emotional Insight (M=2.44, SD= 1.18)
• X2 High Insight= M + 1SD = 2.44+1.18=3.62
X2 Low Insight= M - 1SD= 2.44-1.18=1.26
• b1 at X2 (high) = b1 + b3 X2 = 3.62=-.14+ (-.14)(3.62)=-.65/3.62=.05+(-.14)(3.62)=-.50
      b1 at X2 (low) = b1 + b3 X2 = 1.26=-.14+ (-.14)(1.26)=-.32/1.26=.05+(-.14)(1.26)=-.13
• Constant (from SPSS regression print out)= 4.20
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Appendix J
Below are the calculations for the Positive Transference X Intellectual Insight 
on Session Outcome regression lines for the above average and below average Attention 
groups. Positive transference was assessed using the MITS.
Low Attention
• Significant F change = .04
• Intellectual Insight (M=2.87, SD= 1.22)
• X2 High Insight= M + 1SD = 2.87+1.22=4.09
      X2 Low Insight= M - 1SD= 2.87-1.22=1.65
• b1 at X2 (high) = b1 + b3 X2 = 4.09=.06+ (-.43)(4.09)=-1.7
     b1 at X2 (low) = b1 + b3 X2 = 1.65=.06+ (-.43)(1.65)=-.65
• Constant (from SPSS regression print out)= 3.4
High Attention
•  Significant F change=.28
• Intellectual Insight (M=3.31, SD= 1.12)
• X2 High Insight= M + 1SD = 3.31+1.12=4.43
X2 Low Insight= M - 1SD= 3.31-1.12=2.19
• b1 at X2 (high) = b1 + b3 X2 = 4.43=-.029+ (.227)(4.43)=.97
      b1 at X2 (low) = b1 + b3 X2 = 2.19=-.029+ (.227)(2.19)=.47
• Constant (from SPSS regression print out)= 4.4
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Appendix K
Below are the calculations for the Positive Transference X Intellectual Insight 
on Session Outcome regression lines for the above and below average Clarity groups. 
Negative transference was assessed using the MITS.
Low Clarity
• Significant F change = .03
• Intellectual Insight (M=2.73 SD=1.15 )
• X2 High Insight= M + 1SD = 2.73+1.15=3.88
X2 Low Insight= M - 1SD= 2.73-1.15=1.58
• b1 at X2 (high) = b1 + b3 X2 = 3.88=.148+(-.416)(3.88)=-1.47
      b1 at X2 (low) = b1 + b3 X2 = 1.58=.148+(-.416)(1.58)=-.51
• Constant (from SPSS regression print out)= 3.59
High Clarity
• Significant F change = .09
• Intellectual Insight (M=3.50, SD=1.11 )
• X2 High Insight= M + 1SD = 3.50+1.11=4.6
X2 Low Insight= M - 1SD= 3.50-1.11=2.4
• b1 at X2 (high) = b1 + b3 X2 = 4.6=-.361+(.442)(4.6)=1.67
      b1 at X2 (low) = b1 + b3 X2 =2.4=-.361+(.442)(2.4)= .70
• Constant (from SPSS regression print out)= 4.7
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Appendix L
Below are the calculations for the Negative Transference X Emotional Insight 
on Session Outcome regression lines for the above and below average Clarity groups. 
Negative transference was assessed using the 3-item measure of transference.
Low Clarity
• Significant F change = .059
• Emotional Insight (M=1.82, SD= .89)
• X2 High Insight= M + 1SD = 1.82+.89=2.71
X2 Low Insight= M - 1SD= 1.82-.89=.93
• b1 at X2 (high) = b1 + b3 X2 = 2.71=-.244+(-.251)(2.71)=-.92
      b1 at X2 (low) = b1 + b3 X2 = .93=-.244+(-.251)(.93)=-.48
• Constant (from SPSS regression print out)= 4.16
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Appendix M
Below are the calculations for the Attention X Negative Transference 
on Session Outcome regression lines. Negative transference was assessed using the 3-
item measure of transference.
Significant F change = .03
• Attention (M=3.7, SD=.77 )
• X2 High attention= M + 1SD = 3.7+.77=4.47
X2 Low attention= M - 1SD= 3.7-.77=2.93
• b1 at X2 (high) = b1 + b3 X2 = 4.47= .64+(-.209)(4.47)=-.30
      b1 at X2 (low) = b1 + b3 X2 = 2.93= .64+(-.209)(2.93)=.02
• Constant (from SPSS regression print out)= 2.0
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